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Article
The Public Trust in Public Art: Property Law’s Case
against Private Hoarding of “Public” Art
HOPE M. BABCOCK
Private hoarding of important works of art is a phenomenon that has caused
their disappearance from public view. The loss of this art undermines republican
values like education, community, and citizenship, and therefore should be resisted.
This Article explores various legal tools to prevent this from happening, including
doctrines and laws that protect artists’ rights in their work, but which offer the
public little relief. Turning to two well-known common-law doctrines—public
dedication and public trust—to see whether they might provide a solution, the
author favors the latter because it is nimbler and better suited to the public nature
of important works of art. But she recognizes that making viable use of the public
trust doctrine requires enhancement with incentives, such as those offered by listing
the art on a register, the tax code, and external norms of social behavior. The Article
is a tribute to Professor Joseph L. Sax’s public trust scholarship, which has inspired
so many of us who follow in his footsteps.
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The Public Trust in Public Art: Property Law’s Case
against Private Hoarding of “Public” Art
HOPE M. BABCOCK*
INTRODUCTION
Legal change usually lags behind social and cultural change, and our
laws have a lot of catching up to do with respect to art.1 This Article explores
the case against private hoarding of art that is of such value to a country’s
self-identity that one might properly call it public art, even though the art is
privately owned. Private hoarding deprives ordinary people of access to
works of art of national importance and thus undermines republican values
like education, community, and citizenship. Therefore, it should be
discouraged. The Article’s focus on privately owned public art starkly poses
“the conflict between private property rights in that art and the public’s
interest in preserving its heritage,”2 a riff on a familiar conflict in the field
of natural resources.
The late Professor Joseph L. Sax’s book, Playing Darts with a
Rembrandt: Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures,3 explores this
conflict. While Professor Sax acknowledges that the state has tools, like
condemnation, to acquire important art and dedicate it to the public’s use,
enjoyment, and education, he focuses on the questions that arise before that
moment: “What powers and responsibilities should be recognized in the
owners of such objects in the first place.”4 Although Professor Sax mentions
the problem of art being withheld by its owners from public viewing, 5 his
attention is more devoted to preventing these individuals from destroying
*

Professor Babcock teaches environmental and natural resources law at Georgetown University
Law Center whose generosity has contributed to the writing of this and other articles. She is also grateful
for the careful editing by her research assistant, Carly Dooley. In this piece, as in her other work on the
public trust doctrine, Professor Babcock owes a deep debt of gratitude to Professor Joseph Sax whose
work on the public trust doctrine continues to guide and inspire her own work on the doctrine.
1
Albert Elsen, Introduction: Why Do We Care about Art?, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 955–56 (1976)
(quoting John Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1042 (1976)).
2
Cathay Y. N. Smith, Community Rights to Public Art, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 369, 371 (2016).
3
JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN
CULTURAL TREASURES (1999). In this book, Professor Sax examines the conflict between the rights of
private owners of public art, the creators of that art, and the public’s interest in protecting that art.
4
Id. at 9.
5
See id. at 8 (“Inaccessibility is an even more pervasive problem than destruction or
mutilation . . . . During the booming 1980s some of the great impressionist paintings in the world were
purchased by corporations and haven’t been seen since.”).
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what is essentially their private property. Surprisingly, for the progenitor of
the modern public trust doctrine,6 Professor Sax does not discuss the
possible role that doctrine might have in addressing both the hoarding and
destruction of public art by individuals.
This Article does what Professor Sax did not do: It explores whether the
public trust doctrine, historically applied to allow public access to lands and
waters of especial public value, might apply to objects with no connection
to either. It examines how the doctrine might be used to remedy the problem
of private hoarding of public art by analogizing repelling public access to
trust-protected natural resources and preventing public access to public art.
Part I sets about these tasks by describing what might qualify as “public”
art—a work of such importance that “the larger community has a legitimate
stake”7 in it. Part II then describes the art world in which such hoarding takes
place. This is a world that has changed dramatically in the last half century
to democratize the display of art and its valuation by dispersing control over
that process to many participants, while still hosting a subset of wealthy art
owners who have withdrawn important art from public view. Part III
explains why hoarding art of public value undermines important republican
values and should be both resisted and remedied.
Part IV identifies two possible approaches to remedying the problem of
art hoarding: application of the doctrine of moral rights and laws like the
Visual Artists Rights Act.8 While these approaches may protect artists and
their work from unauthorized replication or physical damage, none of them
directly protects the public. Thus, they offer little help against individuals
who withhold important artistic work from public view. In Part V, the
Article investigates two common-law property doctrines—public dedication
and public trust—to see if either might be applied to “public” art. The author
finds more bandwidth in the public trust doctrine than public dedication
because of commonalities between culturally important art and
trust-protected natural resources, as well as more flexibility in that doctrine
than public dedication. But the controversial nature of the public trust
doctrine makes its application problematic in any circumstance. Therefore,
Part VI of the Article examines whether social norms together with the

6
See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 474 (1970) (explaining the outline of the public trust doctrine and
it’s use for “resource management problems”). Sax’s article is considered by most scholars of the doctrine
as seminal in the field and the origin point of the doctrine’s revitalization. See, e.g., Douglas Martin,
Joseph Sax, Who Pioneered Environmental Law, Dies at 78, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/11/us/joseph-l-sax-who-pioneered-legal-protections-for-naturalresources-dies-at-78.html [https://perma.cc/8SZ2-Y977] (describing Sax’s public trust article as
“seminal”).
7
SAX, supra note 4, at 9.
8
17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).
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availability of financial incentives, like those offered by the tax code, might
make the use of that doctrine more viable.
In proposing the use of the public trust doctrine to remedy a problem far
removed from the doctrine’s traditional base, the author is fully aware that
she may be taking the doctrine beyond where Professor Sax thought it ought
to go and doing what she warned against in another article she wrote.9 But
believing that much can be learned about a doctrine from testing its
application in surprising settings, and satisfied that she has weighed the risks
of stretching the doctrine too far, she sets out on that task here.10
I.

WHAT IS “PUBLIC” ART AND WHY DO WE CARE ABOUT IT?

A society cannot be great without a strong and pluralistic
commitment to the arts. The arts help to bring order to our
lives. They provide us with a sense of perspective. They
enhance our perception of the relations of men and women to
each other and to their society. The arts help our people to
communicate with each other; they help to provide a record of
our society. What are really at stake are new and stronger ways
of enchancing [sic] our humanity, our sense of the grand and
the good, our reaching for harmony and order and hope.11
This Part attempts to define what makes art “public” art and to
understand the relationship between its owners and the art itself. It posits
that public art has unique value for the culture that created it, and that
community value creates a special relationship between the art and its
possessor.
A. What Makes Art “Public” Art
Before determining whether the public should be able to view “public”
art under any legal theory, one needs to understand what public art is. To
Professor Sax, public art carries the “‘essence’ of the nation.”12 Some
examples in this country of what might fit Professor Sax’s definition are
Emanuel Gottlieb Leutze’s “Washington Crossing the Delaware,” Gilbert
Stuart’s “George Washington,” Andrew Wyeth’s “Christina’s World,”
9
Hope M. Babcock, What Can Be Done, If Anything, About the Dangerous Penchant of Public
Trust Scholars to Overextend Joseph Sax’s Original Conception: Have We Produced a Bridge Too Far?,
23 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 390, 433 (2015).
10
Id.
11
Monroe E. Price, State Arts Councils: Some Items for a New Agenda, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1183,
1205 (1976).
12
Joseph L. Sax, Is Anyone Minding Stonehenge? The Origins of Cultural Preservation in England,
78 CAL. L. REV. 1543, 1558 (1990); see also Smith, supra note 2, at 371 (defining public art differently,
describing it as “any media intended and displayed in the public domain, usually outside or in public
buildings and accessible to all persons”).
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Edward Hopper’s “Night Hawks,” and Winslow Homer’s “The Veteran in a
New Field,” to name just a few.13 Each is an iconic painting in which the
artist attempted to impart a lesson about what the artist believed to be of
enduring civic value. Professor Sax calls these objects “heirlooms,” the
essential quality of which is a generational passage over time and the value
of which is distinct from any use they might have.14 “Though an individual
may own the heirloom in a full legal sense, the heirloom can equally be
thought of as ‘belonging’ to a family, whose essential identity is
generational.”15 In this way, public art, the value of which is generational, is
like a communal heirloom, which is something of value to a
community16—a community that can be national, even international in
scope, or as small as a neighborhood.17
Besides being a form of communal heirloom, public art reflects and
belongs to a specific culture.18 In that sense, public art provides the “basis of
cultural memory,”19 and its preservation is considered “essential” to
preserving the “knowledge and wisdom” of that culture.20 Cultural treasures,
like great works of art, are “things of unique value to mankind for future
generations to pass on down through the ages.”21 Art’s cultural nexus
enhances its value beyond that of “a mere chattel.”22 Cultural treasures also

13
See The 50 Greatest American Paintings, COMPLEX (May 1, 2012),
www.complex.com/style/2012/05/the-50-greatest-american-paintings (listing these among other “great
American paintings”).
14
See Sax, supra note 12, at 1560 (“There are two elements in an edifice, its utility and its beauty.
Its utility belongs to its owner, its beauty to everyone. Thus to destroy it is to exceed the right of
ownership.”).
15
Id. at 1564.
16
See Smith, supra note 2, at 371 (defining community as “the people with common interests living
in a particular area”).
17
But see Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preservation as a Public Duty: The Abbé Grégoire and the
Origins of an Idea, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1142 (1990) (“As uncontroversial as heritage preservation
may appear when one thinks of historic monuments and artistic masterworks, the idea of an officially
designated culture seems greatly at odds with modern sensibilities.”).
18
See Francesco Francioni, Public and Private in the International Protection of Global Cultural
Goods, 23 EURO. J. INT’L L. 719, 720 (2012) (“Art itself, as a medium essentially devoted to giving form
to cultural expression, always transcends its economic value as a mere object and reflects the pluralism
and diversity of tastes and inclinations of the societies that have produced it.”).
19
John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339, 347
(1989); see also id. at 349 (“The need for cultural identity, for a sense of significance, for reassurance
about one’s place in the scheme of things, for a ‘legible’ past, for answers to the great existential questions
about our nature and our fate—for all these things, cultural objects provide partial answers.”).
20
Elsen, supra note 1, at 952.
21
Judy Gechman, Rescuing Cultural Treasures: The Need for an Incentive Generating Doctrine,
24 HOUS. L. REV. 577, 601 (1987); see also Merryman, supra note 19, at 348 (“Life may be short, but
art is long. The object that endures is humanity’s mark on eternity.”).
22
See Elsen, supra note 1, at 952 (“A French jurist recognized ‘the superior interest of the human
genius’ that creates art. Art’s uniqueness in terms of irreplaceability and its capacity so often to survive
its maker, his society, and the ages account for its being valued more than as a mere chattel.”).
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support a sense of participation in a “shared enterprise.” Thus, public art
“nourish[es] a sense of community, of participation in a common human
enterprise.”24 Public art can also exemplify and express a community’s
“moral attitudes.”25
The communal value of public art makes it more in the nature of
“‘communal property’ or public patrimony, which is essential to the
sentiment of belonging to a collective social body and to the transmission of
this sentiment to future generations.”26 What makes a preservation regime
that protects a society’s heritage novel is that that heritage is being protected
not as a thing with its own “intrinsic value”—be that value “aesthetic,
historical, archaeological”—but “rather because of its association with a
social structure of a cultural community which sees the safeguarding of its
living culture as part of its human rights claim to maintain and develop its
identity as a social body beyond the biological life of its members.”27 Thus,
most people feel a “racial, ethnic or even national affinity” toward property
of cultural value28 and “care in special ways about objects that evoke or
embody or express their own and other people’s cultures.”29 Professor Smith
explained that:
[w]hen a piece of public art comes to embody a community’s
identity and culture, when it becomes a landmark or
identifying symbol of a community, when it comes to define a
community’s social relationships, sustain the community’s
social rules, or strengthen the community’s social values, it
transcends being just a piece of art and becomes part of a
community’s heritage.30

23

Sax, supra note 17, at 1142.
Merryman, supra note 19, at 349; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 381 (“[W]orks of art are
elaborate mechanisms for defining social relationships, sustaining social rules, and strengthening social
values.”).
25
Merryman, supra note 19, at 346; see also id. at 347 (“The maker [of art] chooses whether to
settle for something that is ‘good enough’ or strive for something better. Every such choice embodies a
moral decision, and that morality is communicated, more or less perfectly, to the viewer who confronts
or the scholar who studies the object. ‘[T]he morality of art consists in the perfect use of an imperfect
medium.’”).
26
Francioni, supra note 18, at 722. Francioni goes on to say “[i]n this sense, cultural heritage
becomes an important dimension of human rights, in as much as it reflects the spiritual, religious, and
cultural specificity of minorities and groups.” Id.
27
Id. at 726.
28
Gechman, supra note 21, at 601–02; see also Merryman, supra note 19, at 341 (providing a
broader definition of “cultural property,” and saying “[b]y ‘cultural property’ I mean objects that embody
the culture—principally archaeological, ethnographical and historical objects, works of art, and
architecture; but the category can be expanded to include almost anything made or changed by man”).
29
Merryman, supra note 19, at 343.
30
Smith, supra note 2, at 383.
24
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In these ways, public art, which embraces a community’s identity and
culture, transcends the artist’s time.31 Its cultural importance gives this form
of art public significance beyond its creation for individual enjoyment.32
Great works of art often are “an ageless testimony to beauty” in that
culture,33 a supposition supported by substantial empirical evidence in the
form of the “thousands of museums, tens of thousands of dealers, hundreds
of thousands of collectors, millions of museum visitors; [and] brisk markets
in art and antiquities . . . .”34 Moral rights laws35 in some countries and the
art preservation laws of states like California and Massachusetts also show
the public’s interest in great works of cultural art.36 Additionally, “[a] great
deal of public, corporate, and individual time, effort, and money are spent in
making, finding, acquiring, preserving, studying, exhibiting, interpreting,
and enjoying cultural objects.”37
B. The Relationship Between the Owners of Public Art and Public Art
Given the national importance of public art, it seems oxymoronic to
consider it to be a fungible good that someone owns.38 Rather, public art is
better seen as “patrimonial property that in some respects ‘belongs’ to the
nation and to posterity.”39 Owners of public art act more like transitory

31

Elsen, supra note 1, at 952 (“A work of art can also exist out of time for an artist and
connoisseur.”).
32
Sax, supra note 12, at 1566 (“[T]he standard is national importance.” (quoting Ancient
Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act, ch. 46, § 1(3), 32 HALSBURY STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND
WALES 308 (4th ed. 1987))).
33
Elsen, supra note 1, at 952; see also id. (“On a more mystical level, in the past a great work of
art was thought at times to contain the mana of its royal owner. From Nero to Napoleon, rulers would
plunder art to capture the soul or mystical identity of its royal or urban owner. That magical mana or life
spirit contained in art is now seen as belonging to a nation.”).
34
Merryman, supra note 19, at 343.
35
See infra Part IV.A (discussing moral rights laws).
36
Merryman, supra note 19, at 343; see also infra Part IV.A (discussing moral-rights laws in
California and Massachusetts).
37
Merryman, supra note 19, at 344; see also id. at 345 (stating that “[i]t is abundantly clear that
people care a great deal about cultural property” (internal citation omitted)); Gechman, supra note 21, at
597 (“The 1954 Hague Convention forcefully addressed the importance of cultural preservation in these
words: ‘Damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural
heritage of all mankind since each person makes a contribution to the culture of the world.’ There is,
thus, national and international public policy favoring the preservation of cultural treasures.” (internal
citation omitted)).
38
Charles Patrick Desmond Cronin, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum: Ethical Quandaries of
Art Restitution Claims Against Public Collections 25 n.166 (2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2915276
[https://perma.cc/3NFD-WTZV] (“[T]here’s a monumental issue at stake here that the film scarcely
acknowledges: Does (or should) anyone really own art?”).
39
Sax, supra note 12, at 1545.
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trustees because public art does “not fully belong to them” any more than
an owner of historic property or an ancient monument owns that property.41
This attitude is reflected in the original British legislation to preserve the
country’s heritage property, the Ancient Monuments Act, which, in effect,
redefined individual property rights to include the concept of the
“responsible owner.”42 Implicit in the legislation was the idea that the owner
of nationally valued property possessed the property’s “economic value or
use value” and could be compensated if those values were taken away.
However, this property also had historic and scientific value, which the
country owned, and, therefore, no compensation was owed should its
economic or use value be lessened or lost.43 The fact that the history of
England might be “embedded in a physical structure,”44 like a piece of art,
meant that the object did not belong to an individual, and in preventing the
destruction of that artwork, the nation was “preventing the destruction of its
history.”45 In other words, the nation was “not taking something away from
the owner, but was safeguarding something of its own.”46 The Ancient
Monuments Act thus reflected a “dual conception” of property in which
conventional ownership is “overlaid with a responsibility of care and
preservation for the benefit of the nation in the ages to come.”47
Professor Sax finds the idea of the “responsible owner,” whose use of
property is limited “by public sentiment,” an “intriguing” concept that
implies “a dimension of proprietary entitlement (and its limits) that hardly
ever appears in contemporary discourse about property.”48 This view of
responsible ownership in British preservation law, according to Professor
40

Id.; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 383 (“It becomes ‘the property of mankind and ownership
carries with it the obligation to preserve [it].’ Even though the art may be privately owned, such
ownership is in the nature of a trust for the community’s benefit, and its de jure owner should not be able
to destroy it without legal scrutiny.”); Joseph L. Sax, Imaginatively Public: The English Experience of
Art as Heritage Property, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1097, 1105 n.35 (2005) (noting that the idea of
an owner acting “as a guardian for posterity” existed in ancient Rome “where collecting avidity was
rampant, in Cicero’s condemnation of Verres”).
41
Sax, supra note 12, at 1553.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1554.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 1557.
48
Sax, supra note 40, at 1101; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 379 (“[E]ven though an individual
may be the de jure owner of a piece of cultural heritage, her ownership is qualified. She takes on the role
of steward, retaining the property for the benefit of the public; she can use her property for personal
enjoyment, but she should not be able to deprive the public, a community, or future generations of their
cultural heritage.”); Nicole B. Wilkes, Public Responsibilities of Private Owners of Cultural Property:
Toward a National Art Preservation Statute, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 183 (2001) (“We are
thus left with the idea of ‘preservation as a state responsibility; cultural property as ‘belonging’ to the
nation regardless of formal; and creative achievement as a national asset.”); Merryman, supra note 19,
at 341 (discussing cultural property and how it includes objects that embody the culture).
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Sax, reflects a shift “away from the individual who unqualifiedly owns a
space on the Earth and whatever things happen to sit in that space, to a
community existing in time, nourished by those achievements of centuries
of art and science that are often embodied in physical artifacts.”49 The result
of this evolution in thinking about cultural properties is “the idea of
‘preservation’ as a state responsibility; cultural property as ‘belonging’ to
the nation regardless of formal ownership; and creative achievement as a
‘national asset.’”50
Resonating with the tenets of the public trust doctrine,51 Professor Sax
recognized that “[w]hether the claim [against the cultural property owner]
was put in proprietary terms, as something ‘belonging’ to the nation, or in
some less legalistic form, the concept was the same: The nation as a
collectivity had a preexisting interest in many objects that had always been
considered entirely private,”52 if only to assure their preservation and
appreciation.53 This idea of a “collective obligation to identify and protect
cultural artifacts” is relatively recent,54 as is the thought that individual
owners of cultural art could not be assumed to fulfill that duty.55 Despite
these ideas, British law and other preservation laws leave unanswered the
question of whether the state could forcibly obtain important works of public
art from private collections for display in a public institution.56
49
Sax, supra note 12, at 1545; see also id. at 1549 (viewing the late 19th Century Antiquities
Monuments Act as an embodiment of the principle that “the protection of cultural property was a
governmental duty, and that public ownership and control should be brought to bear on unwilling
proprietors,” commenting that that bill “shifted the line between public and private authority a
considerable distance for that time”).
50
Wilkes, supra note 48, at 183 (citing Sax, supra note 17, at 1168–69); see also id. at 201
(comparing an art preservation regime to the preservation of endangered species because like them,
vulnerable art is subject to extinction if not properly protected).
51
See infra pp. 35–41 (discussing the public-trust doctrine).
52
Sax, supra note 12, at 1554.
53
See id. at 1556 (quoting 14 April 1875, Parl Deb HC (3d ser.) (1875) col. 911 (UK)) (“No
person . . . certainly would propose any undue interference with the rights of private property; but their
ancient monuments, while in a certain sense private property, were at the same time subjects of public
interest . . . [and thus could not simply be left to] the possession of persons who were totally incapable
of appreciating their value, and totally regardless of their preservation.”).
54
Sax, supra note 17, at 1143. Professor Sax traces those thoughts to the French Revolution, which
began the process of “recasting . . . a wide range of artistic, scientific, and historical artifacts as secular
icons with both instrumental and symbolic content for the new republican nation.” Id. at 1151.
55
See Sax, supra note 12, at 1549–50 (responding to resistance to the Ancient Monuments bill by
stating: “It was not necessary to take such a harsh view to recognize that Lubbock’s bill raised a profound
and novel question. What was this communal imperative that could not safely be left to individual owners
acting independently and autonomously, and that promised a much enlarged role for government?”).
56
See id. at 1552 n.28 (finding no instances in which a country condemned art in private collections
to enrich a national museum); see also Gechman, supra note 21, at 602–03 (advocating recognition of
the importance of preserving objects of “unique cultural value” through incentivizing people to take risks
to protect them); Wilkes, supra note 48, at 202 (“In the same way that the state can intervene to protect
children, the government could potentially regulate to safeguard objects of national (or international)
significance.”).
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While property owners can destroy their own property with impunity,
some property is so vested with communal rights, be it the rights of a culture
or nation, that it is conceivable to think that “the community’s right to
preserve its heritage may trump a property owner’s right to destroy [it].”57
The same thinking should apply to public art that has been withdrawn from
public view. The preservation of culturally important pieces of art is an
essential part of any cultural-property policy, as if such a piece of art
disappears or is destroyed, it cannot be studied or appreciated.58 Merryman
describes the consequences of such loss as follows: “[E]very loss of cultural
property through erosion, destruction, careless removal, or improper
conservation measures impairs the quest for cultural truth. Every lost
opportunity for further discovery and study of cultural objects retards the
growth of knowledge about ourselves.”59 Inferentially then, these objects
must be available for scholars to study and for the public to enjoy.60
Accordingly, as Merryman urges, it should follow that “when a piece of
public art transforms from being merely a piece of property to become a
community’s cultural heritage, community rights may trump those of the
individual property owner . . . .”61 This concept is applicable whether
resources are natural or manmade; where a community sought to enjoin
destruction of a house, one court held: “A well-ordered society cannot
tolerate the waste and destruction of resources when such acts directly affect

57
Smith, supra note 2, at 370. Given the importance of preservation, Professor Joseph Sax finds it
“curious” that despite the existence of policies protecting historic, natural, and cultural objects, there is
nothing that “resembles a theory of public preservation policy.” Sax, supra note 12, at 1544.
58
See Merryman, supra note 19, at 355 (“The essential ingredient of any cultural property policy
is that the object itself be physically preserved. The point is too obvious to need elaboration; if it is lost
or destroyed, the Etruscan sarcophagus or the Peruvian textile or the Chinese pot cannot be studied,
enjoyed, or used.”); see also Elsen, supra note 1, at 952 (“The inspirational power of art of the past and
present is crucial in newer countries, such as Poland, that call for the development of a national culture
and give to their citizens a constitutionally guaranteed right to culture.”). But see Francioni, supra note
18, at 727 (describing the European Court of Human Rights’ refusal to create such a policy as leaving
“the public interest in the conservation of a collective cultural patrimony or of the public value of a
cultural landscape . . . in the shadow of the law”). Preservation of objects of cultural importance
institutionalizes what Sax calls “the long view,” and uses preservation

not as a glorification of the past but as a promise to the future that the present will not
impoverish it. In selecting the artifacts it wishes to pass on, preservation policy goes
beyond simply saving certain objects and becomes a symbolic shaping of the national
agenda. It serves as a banner announcing what the nation represents, or at least what
it aspires to represent.
Sax, supra note 12, at 1544.
59
Merryman, supra note 19, at 359.
60
Id. at 360; see also id. at 349 (“The painting was made to be seen, the lamp and the pot to be
used, by others.”).
61
Smith, supra note 2, at 383.
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important interests of other members of that society.” In other words, while
traditional property law doctrines empower property owners to do whatever
they want with their property—within the limits of nuisance law—“some
values are so important to society that the law develops new doctrines to
protect them.”63 This Article argues that the public trust doctrine is one of
those doctrines; although the doctrine is not new, its application to privately
held works of public art is new.64
Before the Article shifts to a discussion of the public trust doctrine, there
is more ground to cover. Accordingly, the next Part describes the current art
world and the practice of hoarding public art.
II. THE ART WORLD
Works of art are among the least fungible forms of moveable
property. Artworks’ uniqueness generates greater emotional
bonds between them and their individual or collective owners
than those that exist between owners and fungible assets like
cash or insurance policies.65
The art world today is substantially different from what it was during
the eighteenth century when the first impulse to open art to public view
arose.66 It is a world inhabited by “[v]isual artists, dealers, galleries,
collectors, museums, auction houses, art critics, art historians, and the art
press [who] cohere in a dense pattern of complex relationships that gives the
visual art world a distinct identity.”67 At the same time that that world has
become more democratic by opening up the display of art to the broader
public68 and by allowing the public to influence the valuation of art through
auction houses and private sales, it has become more exclusive by
concentrating ownership of art in the hands of a few.

62

Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 211, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); see also
Kristen A. Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1028 (2009) (“[S]ome cultural
resources are so sacred and intimately connected to a people’s collective identity and experience that
they deserve special consideration as a form of cultural property.”).
63
See Gechman, supra note 21, at 594 (using Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104 (1978), as an example of the government overriding old doctrines in favor of new ones to
protect important interests).
64
See infra Part V.C.
65
Cronin, supra note 38, at 28.
66
Sax, supra note 40, at 1098.
67
John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1045–46
(1976).
68
Elsen, supra note 1, at 952 (“The secularization and democratization of art itself in recent times
has been accompanied by growing sophistication on the part of the public about its own interest in
culture.”).
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Museums occupy a place in this new world and both affect it and are
affected by it69—often as competitors for public art,70 but more recently
selling off parts of their collections to get money to make capital
improvements to their facilities or to acquire new works of art.71 This process
is called deaccession: the permanent removal or disposal of an object from
the collection of the museum by virtue of its sale, exchange, donation, or
transfer by any means to any person.72 The recent downturn in financial
markets and a general decrease in funding of the arts have increasingly
propelled museums to deaccession their collections.73 Deaccession is very
controversial.74 However, this Article does not get into that controversy and
69

There are 35,000 public and private museums in the United States, many of which “struggle to
stay open and fulfill their missions.” Paul Sullivan, A Collector’s Dream: Creating Your Own Museum
as a Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2017, at B5.
70
See Seth Tipton, Connoisseurship Corrected: Protecting the Artist, the Public and the Role of
Art Museums Through the Amendment of VARA, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 269, 301 (2009) (“Although
perhaps less dangerous to art scholarship, connoisseurship’s subjectivity has helped fuel exponential
growth in art prices, as well as serve as the basis for astronomically expensive museum acquisitions.”).
71
Many millions of dollars are paid for art that has been identified by favored art critics and their
wealthy patrons as the art to own. See id. at 281–82 n.91 (citing 1 RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESSLER,
ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS at 321–22 (3d ed. 2005),
to “explain[] the upward growth in the art auction market, and not[e] that Christie’s and Sotheby’s now
each report gross sales over $1 billion per year”).
72
Derek Fincham, Deaccession of Art from the Public Trust, 16 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 1, 2 (2011);
Sara Tam, In Museums We Trust: Analyzing the Mission of Museums, Deaccessioning Policies, and the
Public Trust, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 859 (2012) (“Museum curators, directors, and boards of
trustees typically decide to deaccession an artwork because the artwork no longer fits the museum's
mission, the artwork is of poor or deteriorating quality, or for legal reasons. A museum then disposes of
a work by sale, auction, exchange, or grant to an individual or another institution.”).
73
Fincham, supra note 72, at 3; see also id. at 17 (“In 2009, the Getty Museum, one of the wealthiest
museums in the world, was forced to cut its annual budget by 24% and make 97 members of staff
redundant. The Art Institute of Chicago lost nearly 24% of its endowment in 2009.”).
74
See Cronin, supra note 38, at 28 (“When an artwork enters the collection of a public museum, its
prestige and financial worth increase because the public values not only the work itself, but also the
museum’s imprimatur of connoisseurship. Because the public generates value, it also, over time,
develops an affinity with the work and thereby acquires interest akin to ownership of it. This is why
museums’ attempts to de-accession works to generate funds, even to survive, are typically met with
vociferous opposition.”). Indeed, some consider that the process has created a “crisis” for American
museums. Fincham, supra note 72, at 1 (citing as examples of the problems deaccession creates “the loss
of works from the public trust, the closure of museums and unnecessary legal disputes”). But see
Gechman, supra note 21, at 600 n.164 (“The fact that cultural items can be sold has given them the
chance to survive. Museums can then acquire them by purchase. It is a means, therefore, of preserving,
not destroying, cultural treasures. . . . The private sale of important cultural items has saved many of
these items.”). An example of a recent controversy generated by the Berkshire Museum’s auction of forty
works of art, including two Norman Rockwell paintings that the artist had given to the museum. A group
that included three of Rockwell’s children unsuccessfully sued in a Massachusetts state court to stop the
sale arguing that the sale breached the museum’s fiduciary duties. Matt Stevens, Rockwell Family Files
Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2017, at C4. Deaccession is not only a United States phenomenon. France
recently declared a Marquis de Sade manuscript a “national treasure” and blocked its sale at a public
auction for thirty months with a goal of raising sufficient funds to keep it in the country. Kimiko de
Freytas-Tamura, Salacious, Shocking and Sordid, And Now a National Treasure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
2017, at A9.
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concerns itself only with what happens to deaccessioned art after it is sold
and disappears from public view.
A recent example of deaccession was the scheduled sale at auction of
the entire permanent collection of the Fresno Metropolitan Museum of Art
and Science—some 3,000 objects of art.75 Should the Fresno Art Museum
close as well, the sale would mean that there would be “no contemporary art
between Los Angeles and San Francisco.”76 To get an idea of the scope of
the process, “[n]early a third of the art sold at Christie’s May 2009
sale . . . were works of art deaccessioned from US museums.”77 “Many of
these sales take place behind closed doors.”78 Deaccession can benefit
wealthy private collectors who buy that art. For example, in 2009 the Orange
County Museum of Art sold eighteen California Impressionist paintings to
a private collector—“a move which another museum director called an
erosion of ‘civic behavior and collegiality.’”79
Museums enabled art collections, which had previously been housed in
private homes of the very rich, to move into a space that was both fixed and
publicly accessible.80 Because great works of art are now available for
viewing at museums, museums exercise an important public educational
role81 through public exhibitions, in which they produce and share cultural
knowledge.82 Modern museums help form “a community’s identity” by
promoting “civic pride, cultural understanding, and scholarship”83 and act as

75

See Fincham, supra note 72, at 3; see also id. at 17 (“In 2009, the Getty Museum, one of the
wealthiest museums in the world, was forced to cut its annual budget by 24% and make 97 members of
staff redundant. The Art Institute of Chicago lost nearly 24% of its endowment in 2009.”).
76
Id. at 2.
77
Id. at 2–3. Fincham reports that in 2009, the Orange County Museum of Art sold eighteen
California impressionist paintings to a private collector. Id. at 3.
78
Id. at 3
79
Id.
80
See Sax, supra note 40, at 1136 (“Whereas the venue for seeing art had previously, and
necessarily, been on the collector’s own premises or episodically in a temporary exhibition, it had now
moved into a permanent, publicly-accessible art museum.”).
81
Tam, supra note 72, at 854–55; see also id., at 857 (“Through exhibitions, museums offer their
visitors an opportunity to exercise critical faculties and develop new perspectives; this is the lifelong
learning that museums provide.”); G. HAMILTON, Education and Scholarship in the American Museum,
in ON UNDERSTANDING ART MUSEUMS (1975), reprinted in 2 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS,
AND THE VISUAL ARTS 7-2, 7-3 (1979) (“Since 1870, no museum has been founded in the United States
‘without formally recognizing its obligation toward public education’” (quoting Note, Protecting the
Public Interest in Art, 91 YALE L.J. 121, 132 n.60 (1981)).
82
Tam, supra note 72, at 856 (“[W]hat museums have in common is the desire to provide
educational experiences by offering public access to curated and intellectually stimulating exhibitions.”).
83
Id. at 857–58.
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84

“creative and expressive cultural institutions.” One definition of public art
is art housed in a public institution like a museum.85
However, the educational role of a museum as a repository of public art
is diminishing as museums are increasingly priced out of the art market
should they want to add to or diversify their collections.86 Because the
wealthy can acquire art at higher prices than museums,87 museums cannot
add new works to their collections, and their collections become static.88
This depreciates the educational value of museums and lessens their
attraction to the public, decreasing attendance and revenues.89
There are also private museums,90 which wealthy individuals with large
collections of important art establish as tax-exempt organizations to which

84
Id.; see also Fincham, supra note 72, at 19 (“They preserve and display works of art for scholars,
the public and future generations.”). But see id. at 20 (“The overwhelming majority of works of art held
by most museums will never be displayed publicly” in part due to space constraints and costs).
85
The artist González-Torres has another view that “what makes a work public is not its location,
but its relationship with the audience. This is a more profound sense of public art, for it injects a
dimension that is not commonly associated with art, even public art, as commonly defined—democracy,
in a participatory sense. The artist is removed from the pedestal as the sole creative genius behind the
work. Instead, the audience participates in the work’s ongoing process of creative destruction and
reproduction.” Gregory S. Alexander, Objects of Art; Objects of Property, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y, 461, 466–67 (2017).
86
See Wilkes, supra note 48, at 196 (“The San Francisco Museum of Modem Art (the ‘SFMOMA’)
filed suit against the heirs of Madeleine Haas Russell for breach of an oral contract, stemming from the
failure of the museum and the Russell heirs to reach an agreement with respect to the sale of a Picasso
painting owned by Madeleine Haas Russell since 1969. Although the SFMOMA offered to purchase
Picasso’s 1932 “Nu au fauteuil noir” for $44 million, the painting was sold at Christie’s for a hammer
price of $41 million to a private collector.”); see also Sax, supra note 40, at 1137 (“A great deal of
superlative art nevertheless resides in private collections and museums avidly seek many of these works.
Indeed, when important works come up for sale, the richest collectors can and commonly do outbid
museums, whose acquisitions budgets are quite limited.”).
87
An example of art going to private collectors at astronomical prices is the recent sale of a painting
of “disputed quality” attributed to Leonardo da Vinci, Salvator Mundi, at Christie’s for $450.3 million
dollars, a price that “no museum could possibly afford.” Robin Pogrebin, After Leonardo Sale, Art World
Wonders: Is the Sky the Limit? N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2017, at A24.
88
But see Gechman, supra note 21, at 598 (“The other argument against burdening private
collecting is that doing so may work against the goal of preservation. We want people to have an incentive
to preserve items with cultural significance. The high monetary value of good title in the market place is
an encouragement to preservation.”).
89
The current financial condition of museums is already tenuous. See Fincham, supra note 72, at
17 (“The current financial outlook for museums is likely to be one of the most difficult in decades. In
2009, the Getty Museum, one of the wealthiest museums in the world, was forced to cut its annual budget
by 24% and make 97 members of staff redundant.”). The Art Institute of Chicago lost nearly 24 percent
of its endowment in 2009. Museums are raising admissions fees, laying off staff, dropping exhibitions
and even imposing furloughs. One hundred universities from all over the country have been forced to cut
arts budgets. Id.
90
Michael Shnayerson, Inside the Private Museums of Billionaire Art Collectors, TOWN &
COUNTRY, Jan. 16, 2017, http://www.townandcountrymag.com/leisure/arts-and-culture/a9124/privatemuseums-of-billionaires/ [https://perma.cc/RVY3-34EC] (“For the world’s 1,810 billionaires . . . private
museums are the ne plus ultra: rooms of utterly impractical beauty that only the wealthiest can afford.”).
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they then donate their private art collections, providing a nice tax break.91
Private museums are a recent phenomenon.92 Private museums do not have
to open their doors to the public and many do not.93 Often the art found in
private museums is acquired through a public museum’s deaccession of its
collection. Private museums also offer collectors power and control over
their art,94 and having a private museum can give a collector the prestige and
visibility to get access to the hottest artists’ work, which may enable them
to acquire art at a lower price.95 In this way, private museums help inflate
the price of art well beyond the purchase capacity of most public museums.96
Public museums are mostly funded by the government and are managed
by trustees with the public interest in mind.97 Private collectors, however, do
not operate under a public-interest mandate and are under no obligation to
make their art available to the public, even art that they acquired from a
public museum.98 There are no norms or laws regulating the deaccession
process to ensure that works of art remain available to the public.99
Sometimes, the purchased art is taken out of the public museum’s immediate
jurisdiction, making its removal from public viewing more complete.100
Some scholars contend that private ownership is not necessarily bad
because the art “still exists”—it has not been destroyed and thus can be
91

See id. But see Sullivan, supra note 69, at B5 (noting that founders of private museums are “under
extreme scrutiny by the I.R.S. and the public,” the tax break can be offset by the costs of building and
maintaining a museum, and some business entrepreneurs have “trouble making the mental leap involved
in giving their collections to the public”).
92
Shnayerson, supra note 90 (“Of the 236 private contemporary art museums totted up globally in
the BMW Art Guide by Independent Collectors, more than 80 percent have arisen since 2000. The United
States has 43 of them, second only to South Korea.”); see also Sullivan, supra note 69, at B5 (“Private
museums aren’t new, but they’ve grown significantly in terms of the numbers in the last 10 years or so.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
93
Shnayerson, supra note 90 (“‘If you lend art on a rotating basis to other institutions as one of
your [private foundation’s] purposes then you don’t have to open your private museum to the public.’”
(quoting Ralph Lerner, co-author of Art Law, a “classic” textbook)). But see Gechman, supra note 21, at
598 (stating that “[a]llowing private collections will diversify the kinds of things that are preserved,” and
“[p]art of the reason we would lose something is that private collections often become public eventually,
and many private collections are currently open to the public”).
94
Shnayerson, supra note 90 (“If he gives a painting to the Museum of Modern Art . . . he’ll never
have control over it again. He’ll never be able to say what type of light bulb to shine on it. Or when it
should be pulled up from the basement and displayed.”).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
See id. (“By definition a public museum is funded mostly by the public—which is to say
government at one level or another—and is steered by trustees who do what’s best for the public not
what’s best for a wealthy donor.”).
98
See Tam, supra note 72, at 882 (“The uproar in reaction to the Metropolitan Museum’s decision
to deaccession in 1973 highlights a fear of art returning to private hands where it would be, presumably,
forever inaccessible to the public.”).
99
Fincham, supra note 72, at 19.
100
See Tam, supra note 72, at 878 (“The State Attorney General is frequently concerned with
retaining the collection within the city or state in which the museum is located.”).
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resold to other collectors or loaned to museums.
Indeed, “[m]any
American collectors describe themselves as ‘merely the temporary
custodian[s]’ of their collections and are dedicated to donating, lending, and
otherwise sharing their collections with museums and the public.”102 But the
evidence shows that this is not the behavioral norm among private collectors,
and even if it were, the worry remains that there are no rules or norms
preventing privately held art from disappearing from public view
permanently or for a very long time into private homes, offshore bank vaults,
and other inaccessible places.103 Indeed, this worry prompted the Irish arts
minister to give $763,000 to the National Museum of Ireland and the
National Library of Ireland to buy back “significant elements” of W. B.
Yeats’s collection of culturally significant items, which Sotheby’s in
London had auctioned off for approximately $2.7 million.104 The
government only intervened “after high-profile Irish literary, artistic and
academic figures decried the sale as a great loss to the country’s cultural
heritage.”105
While destruction of public art in private hands is always a worry, like
what Professor Sax wrote about in Playing Darts with a Rembrandt, the
concern that animates this Article is the loss of that art to public view.106 But,
101

See Wilkes, supra note 48, at 210 n.249 (stating that “private collections will diversify the type
of cultural property that is preserved . . . . Private collecting injects private tastes and preferences into the
public realm, thereby avoiding the specter of government censorship and ‘idea regulation,’” and citing
as an example of this “the controversy surrounding the collection of Dr. Albert C. Barnes, who acquired
an extensive collection of French Impressionist and post-Impressionist paintings at a time when the art
community was highly critical of such work”).
102
Tam, supra note 72, at 898; see also Sax, supra note 40, at 1136 (“[T]he collector community
worldwide today evinces an admirable willingness to provide benefactions in the form of gifts of art to
museums.”).
103
Cronin, supra note 38, at 22 (“However, many, if not most, of the works that have been turned
over by museums and governments to these claimants have been subsequently sold to the highest bidder,
and the works disappear from museum collections into the hands of private collectors. Most likely some
then migrate to storage vaults in Switzerland or the Cayman Islands where they are seen by no one, like
precious metals stored in darkness by owners anticipating appreciation over time.”); see also id. at 22
n.151 (“Discussing how claimants who successfully obtained Matisse’s Odalisque from the Seattle Art
Museum immediately sold it to casino mogul Steve Wynn who then sold it to a company in the Grand
Cayman Islands, whence it was ultimately shipped to Switzerland for an unknown buyer.” (citing
MICHAEL BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA’S COURTS 224–
25 (2003))); Sax, supra note 17, at 1142 (“Though it is customary to say that no one has a right to destroy
those things comprising our heritage, many such items, especially works of art, are held and enjoyed as
ordinary private goods without public access or regulation of any kind.”).
104
Anna Codrea-Rado, Irish Government Buys Yeats Items After Outcry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2017, at C3; see also Cronin, supra note 38, at 23 (“Unwarranted ‘buy backs,’ however, siphon resources
from, and thereby debilitate, public museums, particularly those with relatively modest financial reserves,
whose primary assets are works of art often acquired by bequest.”).
105
Codrea-Rado, supra note 104.
106
Wilkes, supra note 48, at 187 (“In the case of art collectors, the problems associated with
ownership of historically significant works most often involve (lack of) access, rather than destruction.”);
see also id. (“The problem of the ‘pharoic owner’ was highlighted recently when Van Gogh’s “Portrait
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why should someone who pays a substantial amount of money for a piece of
art be unable to enjoy it in privacy?107 After all, the traditional view of
property is that “‘ownership of physical things’ is ‘private and
unqualified.’”108 Should it matter that the exercise of this prerogative causes
a “loss to scholarship or art history?”109 This Article argues that it does
matter, and that owners of public art have some “obligation to the
community or the public at large” that cabins their unfettered right to enjoy
public art privately and requires that they make their collections open to the
public.110 This Article finds the source of that obligation in the republican
values of citizenship and education. Accordingly, the next Part turns to a
discussion of those values and how hoarding public art undermines them.
III.

REPUBLICAN VALUES AND HOW PRIVATELY HOARDING
PUBLIC ART UNDERMINES THEM

Culture exists to be shared and to inhabit a culture is to
contribute to it.111
Making public art available for viewing by the public is consistent with
republican values.112 High among these values are the importance of
community and education, both of which are essential to creating good
citizens. Public art performs a communal educative function to the extent it

of Dr. Gachet” was unable to be located for display in a traveling exhibition. In the spring of 1990, Ryoei
Saito, owner of the Daishowa Paper Manufacturing Company in Japan, paid $82.5 million at auction for
Van Gogh’s “Portrait of Dr. Gachet,” the highest price ever paid for a painting. Saito indicated that he
would consider cremating the painting with his body to avoid taxes. After Saito died in 1996, both the
Philadelphia Art Museum and the Metropolitan Museum of Art attempted to secure the painting for
exhibitions they were organizing. In June of 1999, it was reported that the painting had dropped out of
sight. The painting was last known to be stored in a warehouse in Tokyo.”).
107
Cronin, supra note 38, at 24 (“Works of art are among the least fungible forms of moveable
property. Artworks’ uniqueness generates greater emotional bonds between them and their individual or
collective owners than those that exist between owners and fungible assets like cash or insurance
policies.”).
108
Wilkes, supra note 48, at 178–79 (quoting SAX, supra note 4, at 3).
109
Id. at 178.
110
Id.
111
See Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121, 171 (2010)
(“Participation, as well as consumption, is the essence of the right to science and culture. ‘Access’
therefore should be understood in terms of access to scientific and cultural materials, tools, and
information; access to opportunities to create as well as to consume; and to share in the senses of both
taking and giving.”).
112
The republican concept of citizens acting out of and in furtherance of the public good is
remarkably like a social norm despite the fact that republicanism requires government intervention in
developing good citizens and norm development is independent from government intervention. Each
depends on idea as an obligation of citizenship (pursuit of and conformance to the common good) and
each is aspirational to the extent that they reflect a desired “community standard” and show people how
“they should behave.” Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social
Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1234 n.11 (2000).
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imparts important civic values and pride in local heritage and thus
contributes to the formation of good citizens.
Citizens imbued with civic virtue who are motivated by a concern for
the community and who have an inclination to promote the common good
reflect republican values.113 Communities nourish good citizens and allow
them to practice the art of good citizenship.114 Communities offer the
“shared historical, cultural, political, and, ultimately, normative context,” in
which political discussions can take place and decisions can be made
affecting the community’s common good.115
In republican thought, the acquisition of information is critical to
helping citizens act responsibly in their community.116 To the extent that
public art creates and nourishes a sense of community, withholding it from
public view diminishes the chance that people will acquire the information
about their own communities and culture they need to become good
citizens.117
“[E]ducation is vital to citizenship in a democratic republic.”118 Key
elements of a republican education are the creation of moral character119 and
what Suzanna Sherry calls “cultural literacy”—“knowledge of and
attachment to” one’s own culture.120
Cultivating such an attachment to one’s nation depends on
both knowledge and assimilation: to feel that she is an
American, a child must learn about America’s cultural and
political heritage and accept it as her own. In other words, to
produce American citizens we must cultivate an American

113

MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 117 (1996); see also Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for
Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 161 (1995) (“Republican virtue is not easy. . . . In fact, attaining
‘natural’ republican virtue takes work.”).
114
Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent Nations” in the
Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 443, 523 (2005).
115
Kathryn Abrams, Comment, Law’s Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1593 (1988).
116
See Sherry, supra note 113, at 131 (“The United States Supreme Court has long recognized what
none of us can doubt: education is vital to citizenship in a democratic republic.”); see also id. at 132
(“[O]ne can reconcile rights and republicanism only by suggesting that a republican citizen needs an
education that will enable her to exercise both the rights and the responsibilities of citizenship.”).
117
See id. at 156–62 (discussing the role of public education in the formation of citizenship).
118
Id. at 131.
119
See id. at 177 (“[T]hat moral character includes the inclination to act in accordance with cultural
norms is, of course, intimately related to my discussion of cultural literacy”); see also id. at 176 (“[T]he
inclination to act responsibly and in accord with basic cultural norms is part of the moral character
conducive to republican citizenship.”).
120
Id. at 157.
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“civic identity.” A shared cultural identity makes possible “a
shared future” and “forge[s] a nation.”121
Common cultural identity is “crucial to republican citizenship.”122 Public art
contributes to cultural identity and can be a source of cultural norms. It offers
citizens a form of literacy in their own culture.
The antithesis of republicanism is individualism, by which people
subordinate the good of the community to their own individual goals123 and
live lives isolated from each other. To the extent that people feed their own
appetites, they ignore the needs of the greater community.124 To Professor
Anthony Kronman, many Americans are individuals who, through
“narcotized consumerism,” have drawn “the boundaries of the world to
coincide with those of our bodily needs,” leaving “each of us wrapped in a
separate cocoon, rocking back and forth between appetite and satisfaction,
uninterested in connecting to anything beyond the magic circle of the
self.”125 Professor Holly Doremus worries that “[l]egitimizing actions based
entirely on self-interest is not likely ever to encourage the development of
an ethic of self-restraint.”126
Individuals who hoard public art are driven by their personal ambition
and interests, and have isolated themselves and their art from the greater
community. They are clearly not acting in the interest of achieving the
republican goal of a broader-based public good. Given the monetary lengths
these individuals are willing to go to acquire art, they are equally clearly not
practicing self-restraint. By depriving the public of an opportunity to educate
itself through exposure to public art, these individuals are also impeding the
creation of civic-minded citizens who will contribute to their

121

Id. at 162–63.
Id. at 163; see also id. at 168 (“In the specific context of education, the National Commission on
Excellence in Education concluded that ‘[a] high level of shared education is essential to a free,
democratic society and to the fostering of a common culture, especially in a country that prides itself on
pluralism and individual freedom.’” (citation omitted)).
123
See Anthony Kronman, Civility, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 727, 730 (1996) (discussing the difference
between being motivated by individual interests and communal interests).
124
See Sherry, supra note 113, at 161–62 (“[John] Adams suggested that ‘[m]en must be ready,
they must pride themselves, and be happy to sacrifice their private pleasures, passions, and interests, nay,
their private friendships and dearest connections, when they stand in competition with the rights of
society.’”).
125
Kronman, supra note 123, at 749.
126
Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 325,
351 (2002); see also Sherry, supra note 113, at 177 (“‘[T]o have a good character means at least two
things: empathy and self-control. Empathy refers to a willingness to take importantly into account the
rights, needs, and feelings of others. Self-control refers to a willingness to take importantly into account
the more distant consequences of present actions; to be in short somewhat more future oriented rather
than wholly present oriented.’” (quoting James Q. Wilson)).
122
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127

communities. Uninformed and uneducated individuals cannot actively
engage in the life of their communities and are thus denied an opportunity
to develop good moral character. “[M]oral character includes the inclination
to act in accordance with cultural norms”128—norms, which this Article
contends, can be found in public art. According to Suzanna Sherry, the best
way to teach moral character is by example,129 which is what public art can
do.
This Article has argued that there is “an identifiable public or
community-centered interest in certain objects,”130 particularly art of
cultural importance. Professor Price echoes that sentiment and explains that
the constraint on ownership of a masterpiece, which prevents it from being
defaced, is not inherent in the art itself, but “might be found in the
relationship of the work to the community. The object is part of the body of
society’s cultural wealth.”131 He contends further that “it might . . . be
possible to say that there is a public right to share reasonably in the aesthetic
value of a work of art,” and “that the public should possess ‘a carefully
controlled power to ensure that works are not totally or arbitrarily withheld
from public view.’”132 Owners of public art who refuse to share it with the
public, therefore, are inappropriately claiming an exclusive right in art that
often is of importance to the greater community.133 He even infers that there
could be a state requirement that art produced under a state subsidy should

127
Kronman, supra note 123 (“Judgments of the second sort imply a willingness to subordinate or
sacrifice our private welfare to that of the community as a whole, and only when we form our judgments
on this basis are we practicing the art of civil government, as classical republicanism conceived it.”).
128
Sherry, supra note 113, at 177.
129
Id. at 178.
130
Wilkes, supra note 48, at 179; see also John Moustakas, Note, Group Rights in Cultural
Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1179, 1203–04 (1989) (arguing that
cultural objects qualifying as ‘property for grouphood’ should be recognized as a new classification of
property rights enforced through a regime of strict inalienability that is “an absolute ban on
transferability”); Sax, supra note 40, at 1140 (“[S]ome things imaginatively belong to the public as part
of a national or cultural heritage, even though they legally belong to a private individual.”).
131
See Price, supra note 11, at 1188; see also id. (“[I]t might in turn be possible to say that there is
a public right to share reasonably in the aesthetic value of a work of art.”).
132
Wilkes, supra note 48, at 181.
133
See Price, supra note 11, at 1188 (arguing that public art’s communal importance deprives its
owner, who is only a temporary custodian of it, of any right to harm or destroy it or withhold it from
public view). In support of his comments about public access, Professor Price explains that it makes no
sense to constrain the export of publicly important art, as some propose, but then withhold it from public
view, because the restriction on exporting public works of art is related to the right to exhibit it. Both
constraining the view of public art and its exportation to another country relate to protecting a country’s
cultural patrimony. To Professor Price “[a] right to access for exhibition seems much more responsive to
the people’s needs” than a ban on exporting public art, as exists in Great Britain. See Sax, supra note 12,
at 1551 (“The government of England does provide for the preservation of medieval structures, restrict
the exportation of famous paintings, and preserve forests.”).
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be available to the public.” Much of what Professor Price argues finds
support in this Article and in republican thinking.
Others who advocate for public access to important works of art
articulate reasons that also sound in republican thought. Professor Judy
Gechman notes that “[i]mplicit in the high value that society places on
preservation of art and culture is the notion that the public should have
access to its heritage.”135 Professor Nicole Wilkes says that there is a distinct
public interest in supporting both the preservation of cultural property and
access to it because it is not only “an aspect of our present culture and our
history; it helps tell us who we are and where we came from.” 136 She calls
the withholding of public art a “crime of omission.”137
Despite these arguments in favor of opening important works of art to
public view because of their importance to making “good citizens,” wealthy
owners still keep these works to themselves. Professor Sax bemoans that
there is “no one in America today who . . . would be credible and effective
in saying to reluctant owners that it is their ‘duty, at certain risk and
inconvenience, to send their choicest treasures’ to be seen by the public.”138
He laments that “[a] sense of responsibility to the public has been replaced
by a sort of philanthropic hauteur”139 or selfishness—not civic pride—which
is the antithesis of republican behavior.
This Part of the Article has identified two of the key tenets of republican
thought—(1) a love of community, and (2) the importance of
education—and how they combine to make a good citizen with good moral
character. It has shown how hoarding art, which is a highly individualistic
venture, undermines those values. Part IV of this Article explores various
doctrines and statutory tools that might open privately held important works
of art to public view and fulfill the republican values of community and
education. For, as Professor Sax writes, “to withhold for several generations
134

Price, supra note 11, at 1187. Professor Price adds that mandating that privately held art be
regularly exhibited at museums would free museum staff from focusing on acquiring new works and
would lessen financial pressures on museums to do that. Id. at 1189–90. But see Wilkes, supra note 48,
at 210 (“Before mandating public access and preservation, the government should therefore establish an
incentive structure to encourage collectors to act in a manner that comports with (and even advances) the
public interest in cultural property.”).
135
Gechman, supra note 21, at 596.
136
Wilkes, supra note 48, at 188.
137
See id. at 178 (“A related problem exists with respect to ‘crimes of omission’ committed by
owners of historically significant objects who choose to withhold their treasures from the general
public.”).
138
See Sax, supra note 40, at 1138; see also id. (“It is not simply the absence of a royal personage
and the social hierarchy a monarchy embodies that prevents such a statement. Rather, in modern times,
it is rare to hear respected writers or connoisseurs charge those who keep their treasures secreted away
with being churlish or to hear such critics assert that hoarders should, and will, be ‘denounced by
opinion.’”).
139
Id. at 1139.
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something that is the gift of another’s genius, and that the entire world
treasures, is a matter that calls out for redress.”140
IV.

WHY THE DOCTRINE OF MORAL RIGHTS AND LAWS
PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF ARTISTS DO NOT ENSURE
PUBLIC ACCESS TO PUBLIC ART

A survey of European moral rights and its philosophical
underpinnings make it clear that the United States’ moral
rights regime is inadequate. Congressional stubbornness in
implementing a [sic] meaningful moral rights legislation has
left a plethora of invaluable works without any protection. The
result is that those works’ owners are free to do whatever they
wish with those works; whether it be misattributing those
works or even destroying them.141
Before turning to the common-law doctrines of public dedication and
public trust, there are two other possible lines of attack for securing public
rights in public art. The first of these is the concept of moral rights, droit
moral, which protects the integrity of a piece of art and with it the artist’s
reputation. The doctrine is more common in Europe than the United States,
even though the concept has been adopted in some state legislation. The
second is an enforcement action under the Visual Artists Rights Act, a
federal law that protects the integrity of an artist’s work product. However,
because each approach focuses on the artist and the artist’s rights in his or
her creation, the public only benefits indirectly. Nonetheless, this Part of the
Article examines these two approaches because, although flawed, each
restricts the ownership rights of those who possess art.
A. An Artist’s Moral Rights
Professor Merryman explains that the moral right of an artist is
essentially a “composite right,” one component of which is “the right of
integrity (of the work of art), also sometimes called the right to respect of
the work.”142 The idea behind the concept is that a work of art expresses an

140

Id. at 1140.
Tipton, supra note 70, at 302.
142
Merryman, supra note 67, at 1027; see also Tipton, supra note 70, at 285 (“[M]oral rights
emerged in European law to recognize and shield art, as it represented the ‘embodi[ment of] the creative
personality of the author,’ and the ‘extension of the author’s personhood.’ Moral rights are broadly
grouped into several categories. The right of attribution protects the artist's right to have her name
correctly associated with a work, to correct misattribution, or conversely, to have her work left
anonymous. The right of integrity protects the work itself, allowing the artist to control any subsequent
modification or mutilation. The right of disclosure allows the artist alone to deem a work finished.
Finally, the right of withdrawal allows an artist to withdraw a work from public display at his choosing.”).
141
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artist’s personality. Any unauthorized change to that work, including
damaging or misrepresenting it, affects the artist’s “identity, personality, and
honor, and thus impairs a legally protected personality interest.”144
Perversely, the complete destruction or mutilation of a piece of art that
obscures the artist’s identity completely does not violate the artist’s moral
rights, as “there is no danger that such destruction will misrepresent the artist
or invade his privacy by subjecting him to excessive criticism or ridicule.”145
Moral rights prevent the owner of a piece of art from claiming a right to
modify it to make the art more to his or her liking. They thus restrict that
owner’s rights in that piece of art, since the rights in the art belong to the
artist.146 However, moral rights do little to advance the interests of the public
in that art, including seeing that art.147 And while an artist’s moral rights are
“perpetual,”148 they protect only the artist’s personality and have nothing to
do with “patrimonial or property rights.”149 Yet, the fact that moral rights
restrict what an owner can do with his or her “private” property lest it

143
Elsen, supra note 1, at 955 (“[T]he modern artist’s work, grounded in the self, becomes a tangible
manifestation of his personality.”).
144
Merryman, supra note 67, at 1027; see also id. at 1041 (“Art is an aspect of our present culture
and our history; it helps tell us who we are and where we came from. To revise, censor, or improve the
work of art is to falsify a piece of the culture. We are interested in protecting the work of art for public
reasons, and the moral right of the artist is in part a method of providing for private enforcement of this
public interest.”).
145
Note, Protecting the Public Interest in Art, 91 YALE L. J. 121, 126 (1981). The other moral rights
in a piece of art—the “right of paternity” that the work be associated with the artist’s name, the right to
withhold the work if the artist does not think that its finished, which “gives the artist an absolute right to
decide when (and whether) a work of art is complete and when (and whether) to show it to the public,”
and the “right to repent or retake” a work of art from its owner—are less relevant for purposes of this
article. Merryman, supra note 67, at 1027–28.
146
Id. at 1047.
147
See Smith, supra note 2, at 407 (“Moral rights are rights that belong to the artist, so they do not
protect the public’s interest in the art. They act more as an antidefamation law to help to protect the
artist’s reputation.”); see also Protecting the Public Interest in Art, supra note 145, at 125 (“They [moral
rights] focus primarily on protecting the artist’s rights in his work, rather than on protecting the much
broader public interest in the artwork itself.”).
148
Merryman, supra note 67, at 1042. Merryman calls this statement a “truisim.” Id.; see also
Tipton, supra note 70, at 286 (“Like other moral rights, the original concept of the right of attribution did
not evaporate with the transfer of the physical work to a buyer of a piece but remained with the artist to
enforce against any subsequent owners. As such, the rights are considered ‘perpetual . . . lasting . . . [and]
theoretically forever.’”).
149
Merryman, supra note 67, at 1025 (contrasting copyright, which protects an artist’s economic
interest in their work, with “[t]he moral right, [which] is one of a small group of rights intended to
recognize and protect the individual’s personality. Rights of personality include the rights to one’s
identity, to a name, to one’s reputation, one’s occupation or profession, to the integrity of one’s person,
and to privacy”); see also Elsen, supra note 1, at 955 (“[T]he moral right of the artist, which in civil law
doctrine is classified as a right of personality, as distinguished from patrimonial or property rights.”).
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150

interferes with the artist’s rights indicates some weakness of private
property rights in important works of art.151
Although generally considered a common-law right, several European
civil law countries, like France, have incorporated the concept of an artist’s
moral rights into their codes, and the concept is consistently included in
international conventions dealing with copyright of the rights of artists.152
European countries, which have codified the moral rights of artists, have
extended those rights from the artist to his or her heirs and, if there be no
heirs, to the community. In this way, codified moral rights become powerful
cultural-preservation laws by expanding on who can invoke an artist’s moral
rights—essentially providing for private enforcement of the public interest
in those rights.153 In the United States, there is no doctrine that protects the
moral rights of an artist, and our laws, primarily copyright, do not distinguish
“rights of personality from patrimonial rights.”154 Federal law provides no
remedy for the artists whose work has been destroyed or misrepresented in
some way, and accordingly, there is no protection of the public interest in
art preservation.155
While a community might try to enforce an artist’s moral rights under
the common law because of the public interest in art preservation, there is

150

See Tipton, supra note 70, at 295 (“Thus, enforcing moral rights may implicate the property
rights of the owner of such a work, but only to disallow any enjoyment of that property that would harm
another’s rights.”).
151
See id. (“The archetypal ‘orthodoxy’ of droits moraux provides that moral rights are ‘perpetual,
inalienable, non-seizable, and universal.’ When the author dies his rights pass to his heirs and to the
community, and what once was an intensely personal right becomes one of the community vis-à-vis art
preservation. It is this fundamentally ‘ephemeral’ nature of moral rights that brings them into conflict
with concepts of property law, which rely on the owners’ ability to do what they wish with the property
they validly own.”).
152
See Merryman, supra note 67, at 1026 (explaining that the moral right was judicially created
and is now supported by statute); see also Tipton, supra note 70, at 288 (discussing the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art.6bis(1), July 14, 1967, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828
U.N.T.S.221, which codifies the moral rights of attribution and integrity, and provides that:
“Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author
shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to
his honor or reputation.” (citations omitted)).
153
Tipton, supra note 70, at 296.
154
See Merryman, supra note 67, at 1042 (explaining why the laws in the United States are
considered undeveloped); see also id. at 1039 (“At the bottom of it all is the significant fact that where
the artist claims a violation of a personality interest, rather than a patrimonial interest, the civil law
responds and our law does not. That is the real difference.”); Protecting the Public Interest in Art, supra
note 145, at 122–23 (“In America, however, attempts by artists to prevent the destruction or mutilation
of their creations through the droit moral have failed. In some cases, the foreign terminology and the
absence of domestic precedent have led courts to reject the doctrine; in others, courts have disapproved
of the basic concept of allowing the artist perpetual control over his artwork.”).
155
Merryman, supra note 67, at 1042.
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no statutory basis for such an action, except in California. California has
a law protecting the artist’s moral rights, which explicitly protects the
“public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic
creations.”157 California’s recognition of the public’s interest in and benefit
from the accurate attribution of art to its creator and in the prevention of
damage to a work of art after the death of its creator provides a basis for the
law giving the public a right to enforce an artist’s rights.158 California
recognizes that it is the public’s interest in preserving the integrity of
“cultural and artistic creations” that empowers the public to act.159 California
law allows an organization that learns of a potential violation of an artist’s
moral rights, even of a deceased artist’s moral rights, to sue to enjoin the
defendant’s behavior.160
The United States’ “moral rights regime” is inferior to its European
counterparts. “Only the moral right of civil law countries guarantees to the
artist that the work will remain as she last saw it and not be altered or
transformed by others.”161 Except for California, there is no publicly
enforceable moral-rights regime in the United States, as those rights, to the
extent they exist, can only be enforced by the artist.162 In the United States,
invaluable works of art are left without adequate protection from destruction,
alteration, and faulty attribution—often done by the private owners of that
art.163 Even in California, which recognizes the public’s strong interest in
important works of art, these rights do not include a public right of access to
see what may have been preserved. If the public has no right to see the
156
But see Tipton, supra note 70, at 297 (“Creating perpetual moral rights for artists implicitly
requires granting standing to others to enforce those rights.”); id. (“Indeed, community standing is almost
implicit in the preservationist goal of moral rights: e.g., when an author dies, the personal right turns into
the public's interest of art preservation.”).
157
Id. at 298.
158
Id.
159
See id. (“The public’s interest is, much like the artist’s interest, one of moral value, not economic
value.”). But see Francioni, supra note 18, at 721–22 (“Cultural property may be seen as moveable
artifacts susceptible to economic evaluation, and for this reason subject to exchange in domestic and
international commerce; but it may also be seen as objects endowed with intrinsic value as expressions
of human creativity and as part of a unique or very special tradition of human skills and craftwork, which
today we call ‘intangible cultural heritage.’ Masterpieces of painting, sculpture, mosaics, inlaid wood,
musical instruments, and oral heritage displayed today in museums, exhibitions, and shops owe their
existence to social structures and traditions that have nurtured and maintained the human knowledge and
skills necessary to produce them.”).
160
Tipton, supra note 70, at 298.
161
Elsen, supra note 1, at 954.
162
See Tipton, supra note 70, at 294 (“Despite the stated goals of many ‘preservation statutes,’
which claim that the recognition of moral rights benefits the entire community, only the artist is allowed
to vindicate those moral rights. Consequently, although the public shares and benefits from the
recognition of moral rights, they are completely powerless when the rights of dead artists are infringed.
Indeed, this standing limitation has the de facto result of limiting moral rights to the life of the person
with standing to enforce them.”).
163
Id. at 302.
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protected art, the public benefit under any moral-rights regime, including
California’s, is only an abstract one.
B. Visual Artists Rights Act
Congress attempted to codify artists’ moral rights in their visual
creations in the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”). The presumption
behind the legislation was that “an author injects her spirit into art she creates
and, therefore, her personality, integrity, and reputation in the art should be
protected.”164 However, not only is VARA limited in its scope and
effectiveness, but, like the moral-rights-of-artists doctrine, VARA also does
nothing to advance the cause of opening privately held important art to
public view.
The intent of VARA is to protect “the right of authorship and the right
of integrity” of certain visual artists and their creations.165 VARA
specifically protects two moral rights: (1) “the right of attribution” and (2)
“the right of integrity.”166 VARA additionally provides a private right of
action against anyone who violates its terms,167 and thus is an improvement
over the common-law doctrine, which does not allow this.
However, VARA’s scope is limited to art of “recognized stature,”168 and
only protects works of visual art like paintings, drawings, or sculptures.169
VARA has no retroactive effect, so it does not protect any visual work of art
by an artist who predeceased VARA.170 A dead artist is seen as having no
moral rights, leaving the owner of that art free to do with it as he or she may
like, even destroying or mutilating it.171 Additionally, VARA does not
protect the artist from anything short of the complete destruction of their
work or from other harms, like wrongful attribution or premature public
display, or authorize the artist to take his or her work back from an owner,
which the common-law doctrine does. Like the common-law doctrine,
VARA does not address the problem of owners of visual art withholding it
from public view.172
164

Smith, supra note 2, at 405; see also Wilkes, supra note 48, at 187–88 (“The current statutory
regime dealing with moral rights in the United States protects the artist’s interest as an individual. Moral
rights are only protected for the life of the artist . . . . The public is thereby cut out of the rights calculation
inherent in the American conception of the droit moral.”).
165
Tipton, supra note 70, at 292.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
See Wilkes, supra note 48, at 192 n.125 (“VARA § 106A (a)(3)(B) seeks to ‘prevent any
destruction of a work of recognized stature.’”).
169
Tipton, supra note 70, at 293.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 293–94.
172
A recent trial in Long Island City, Queens, New York promises to test the protective effect of
VARA with respect to street art. The case involves a lawsuit filed by several graffiti artists against a real
estate developer who destroyed a building, which had been the site of graffiti art for over twenty years.
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Although the moral-rights concept and specific laws like VARA or
California’s law restrict the rights of the owner of public art in some way,
neither addresses the problem of public access to important works of art.
Part V of the Article looks at two common-law property doctrines: (1) the
doctrine of public dedication and (2) the doctrine of public trust, to see if
they might do better. But before it does, Part V discusses the nature of
property and why real-property concepts might be relevant to personal
property like art.
V.

HOW PROPERTY DOCTRINES, ESPECIALLY THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE, MIGHT SECURE PUBLIC ACCESS TO PUBLIC ART

Mandler offers the provocative notion of a conception in the
public mind of these places [heritage places like monuments]
as “imaginatively public,” though not public property in any
legal sense.173
Before launching into a discussion of how property-law doctrines might
be applied to affirm the public’s right to view great works of art, a case must
be made that art is a form of property, like land, to which these doctrines
might apply. Accordingly, this Part opens by identifying key features of
what is commonly considered property and showing their relevance to
public art before it advances to a discussion of two common-law property
doctrines.
A. The Nature of Property and the Relevance of Property Doctrines to
Public Art
For something to be classified as property, it must be “tangible, stable,
and durable.”174 Art has all these characteristics,175 and, like land, art can be
At issue in the case is whether the “ephemeral” work the artists did on the building constitutes “art of
recognized stature,” within the meaning of VARA, entitling them to financial damages for its destruction.
The lawyer for the developer planned to argue, among other things, that VARA protects art, not buildings,
and that the artists themselves over the years had destroyed more graffiti than the developer did by
whitewashing over their work and then destroying the building. Commenting on the novelty of the matter,
the judge noted that he and the jury would be “working with a clean slate” while they explored the “broad
questions of aesthetics, property rights, and the relationship between the arts and gentrification” raised
in the case and decide whose property had greater value—the artists’ or the developer’s. Alan Feuer, At
Graffiti Trial, Real Estate Does Battle with Street Art, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2017, at A22.
173
Sax, supra note 40, at 1124–25.
174
See Alexander, supra note 84, at 461 (“Notably, property law’s interaction with art depends
upon art’s assumption of its own thing-ness, for property law itself traditionally has depended upon
certain assumptions regarding the nature of property—what can be property. It has assumed that art is a
tangible, stable, and durable object.”).
175
But see id. at 463 (quoting the artist, Felix González-Torres answering the question whether a
particular work of art of his is a “thing” by him saying: “This piece requires the participation of the public
in order to exist. It’s a non-static sculpture, it’s always changing, it can disappear, yet at the same time,
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damaged, even destroyed. Possession is a key concept in property
law176—“[t]he common law gives preference to those who convince the
world that they have caught the fish and hold it fast.”177 Professor Rose calls
this a “quintessentially individualistic act: the claim that one has, by
‘possession,’ separated for oneself property from the great commons of
unowned things.”178
Although property owners are generally free to do with their property as
they wish,179 “property is not solely a matter of unrestricted rights.”180
Possessing property “is also a matter of responsibilities or obligations that
the owner owes to other members of the various communities to which he
or she belongs.”181 A myriad of federal, state, and even local requirements
restrict property rights, including the property owner’s right to prevent the
public from entering or using his or her property.182 The extent to which the
rights of an owner of public art include the unrestricted right to exclude the
public from viewing that art is central to this Article.
Moreover, there are affinities between cultural objects, such as public
art, and natural resources, such as landscapes. Conservation is important to
each, and much of their appeal lies in their “expressive values.”183
Additionally, when a public good, like public art or public land, is privatized,
individuals no longer receive a benefit from that public good, and overall

it’s indestructible because it can always be reprinted. It’s an attempt at creating a more democratic
artwork. A public piece.”).
176
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI L. REV. 73, 74 (1985) (“For the
common law, possession or ‘occupancy’ is the origin of property.”); see also John A. Humbach, Property
as Prophesy: Legal Realism and the Indeterminacy of Ownership, 49 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 211, 211
(2017) (“Property is a fundamental and pervasive social practice. In everyday interactions, people
recognize, respect, and reaffirm ‘ownership’ in a myriad of different ways.”).
177
Rose, supra note 176, at 88.
178
Id.; but see Sax, supra note 17, at 1157 n.76 (“The legal notion of things belonging to no one,
or belonging to everyone, or sacred and unavailable for purchase and sale, appears in Roman law.”).
179
See Humbach, supra note 176, at 211 (“There are many similarities between the law of property
and the social practice. In both, for example, owners are viewed as having a variety of special advantages
or benefits, including, most prominently, the right to have or possess the things they own; the right to
exclude others from them; and, generally, the right to deal with them more or less as they please.”).
180
See Alexander, supra note 84, at 462 (“‘Legal Realists’ attacked the then-prevailing conception
of property as thing. They set out to show that property is nothing more than a bundle of rights and other
legal relations existing between persons with respect to interests. This bundle of rights conception of
property quickly caught on and is now the prevailing view in the United States (although not elsewhere
in the world). Lately, a group of legal scholars has launched a revanchist critique of this conception,
arguing that property is the stuff of things.”).
181
Id. at 466. But see id. (“The sense that property exists to create propriety, or the common good,
is simply lacking.”).
182
Id. at 467.
183
Merryman, supra note 19, at 341–42. But see id. at 342 (“The differences, however, are
substantial . . . the cultural object is an approach to the study of humanity, of ourselves; the environment
is a separate part of reality, something outside of ourselves.”).
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social welfare is reduced. Art, like beaches or parks, must be physically
available to be enjoyed.185 And while art can be copied, unlike land or other
natural resources, it cannot be copied without its commercial value
decreasing.186
Although not necessarily tangible, stable, or durable, information and
knowledge are forms of property, as exemplified by the existence of
copyright law.187 Modern legal and economic literature recognizes
information as a public good.188 Unlike housing or food, which can only be
enjoyed by a finite number of people, information is also nonrivalrous,
because its value is not decreased by increasing the number of people who
have access to it.189 Indeed, its value may be enhanced by increased
access.190 Information is also “non-excludable”; no one should be excluded
from sharing something that is a public good, like information or
knowledge.191 Excluding the public from knowledge reduces overall public
welfare, among other harms.192 Hence, privatization of information “comes
at a cost.”193 Since public art conveys information or knowledge to the
general public, it conveys a public good that no one should be excluded from
enjoying, especially considering that the more people have access to it, the
more the art’s value will increase.
184

See Shaver, supra note 111, at 158 (“This privatization, however, comes at a cost. At least three
new inefficiencies are introduced. First, some individuals who could have benefited from the resource
will be priced out of access, reducing overall social welfare.”).
185
See id. at 170–71 (“The requisite access is only satisfied when the good is physically accessible
to all (geographic availability and accommodations of disability), affordable, of acceptable quality,
culturally appropriate, and adaptable to the particular needs of the community and individual.”).
186
See, e.g., Tipton, supra note 70, at 300 (demonstrating that art markets generally assign lower
value to art known to be copied). This is one reason that the disparities between the rich and the poor
with respect to physical goods, like land and art, can be great.
187
Copyright law codifies those property rights. Merryman, supra note 68, at 1025 (“Copyright, for
example, which is available to artists in civil law countries as well as in the United States and other
common law countries, is a patrimonial or property right which protects the artist's pecuniary interest in
the work of art.”).
188
Shaver, supra note 111, at 154–55 (“[T]he right to science and culture should be understood as
a call for knowledge to be treated as a shared public resource, with international collaboration and
universal access as touchstone commitments.”); see also id. at 156 (“Article 27 [of the Universal
Declaration] of Human Rights] conceives of science, culture, and the arts—in short, the myriad
expressions of human knowledge—as global public goods.”).
189
See id. at 157–58 (“The economic term ‘nonrivalrous consumption’ eventually emerged to
describe these goods. Rival goods, such as housing or food, can be enjoyed only by a limited number of
persons without being used up. In contrast, the availability of nonrivalous public goods is not diminished
as greater numbers of people enjoy access to them.”).
190
See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 776 (1986) (“[L]ike the dancers on the green, the more members of
the community that are engaged in commerce, the better—not only for the sake of greater productivity,
but also for the sake of socialization and the inculcation of habits of considering others.”).
191
Shaver, supra note 111, at 158.
192
Id.
193
Id.
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Many of the themes in art, such as “question[ing] the public/private
distinction, the democratizing of the personal, and the importance of
community,” are found in property law and its related legal scholarship.194
The “blurring of lines between public and private and what public means” is
something that property law and art have in common.195 This is not to say
that the distinctions between real and personal property should be
abolished—they should not.196 This Article merely proposes that there are
sufficient similarities between public art and land to warrant the application
of property-law doctrines to both, and suggests that “the law of property
must be appropriately modified in order to deal properly with the special
considerations that are raised by works of art.”197
The Part now turns to two common-law property doctrines, public
dedication and public trust, to examine the extent to which they might be
applied to address the problem of excluding the public from viewing
important works of art. Part VI discusses what modifications might be made
to the latter doctrine to make its application more likely.
B. Public Dedication
“The common law doctrine of public dedication enables the public to
acquire rights in property” that promotes the public’s welfare, even though
the public has no other legal interest in that property.198 The doctrine is based
on combined principles of “gift and contract law”;199 its basic components
are offer and acceptance.200 An invitation by a landowner to the public to use
her property qualifies as an offer; even acquiescence in public use of private
property over a sufficient period of time can constitute an offer for purposes
of applying the public-dedication doctrine.201
194

Alexander, supra note 84, at 462.
Id. at 467.
196
See Protecting the Public Interest in Art, supra note 145, at 131 (“Real property doctrines may
be applied to personalty in order to further public policy as long as disorder or injustice does not result.
Applying the law of public dedication to certain types of personal property would not result in disorder
or injustice and would be in accord with the modern trend to diminish the impact of arbitrary legal
distinctions between real and personal property.”).
197
See Merryman, supra note 67, at 1037 (“The basic position in the United States can be
summarized in this form: A work of art is like any other object of property for legal purposes, except as
modified by the copyright law, and the copyright law protects only property rights. The position in France
and other civil law countries is, on the contrary, that a work of art is different for some legal purposes
from other objects of property, so that the law of property must be appropriately modified in order to deal
properly with the special considerations that are raised by works of art.”).
198
Wilkes, supra note 48, at 196.
199
Id. at 196.
200
Id.
201
See Protecting the Public Interest in Art, supra note 145, at 127 (“For example, an express
invitation to the public to use property constitutes an offer; so can a grant of property to a public body.
Even mere acquiescence by the owner in public use of property for a period of time can constitute an
195
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“If an owner offers a use of her property to the public, and if the public
accepts that offer, the property will be considered dedicated” to that use,202
even though no payment or any other form of consideration has been
made.203 Once property has been dedicated to a public use, its owner, and
even a future owner, cannot overcome or obstruct the public’s use of that
property for its dedicated purposes.204
The owner of dedicated property holds that property in trust for the
public, even though there are no formal trust instruments.205 This makes the
owner of dedicated property comparable to a fiduciary of the public with
respect to any dedicated use of the property.206 The owner of dedicated
property cannot convert his or her property to any use that is inconsistent
with the public’s use of that property.207 These principles apply regardless
of whether the owner is a private person or a public entity, like a
municipality or a state agency.208
Public dedication might be a useful concept to apply to public art as a
way of declaring a continuing protected public interest in that art. The
doctrine offers a “well-established method of asserting public rights in
private property” and, when applied to art, would add public-welfare
considerations to any dispute between the rights of an individual artist and
the rights of the owner of that artist’s work.209 Although the doctrine is
commonly applied to land to protect the public’s recreational interest in that
property, it might be expanded to account for the public’s cultural interest in
art objects.210 Courts have been generous with their interpretation of the offer
offer. In short, when a particular piece of property serves an important public use, courts are eager to
construe circumstances to infer the existence of the required offer and acceptance.”).
202
Id. at 126; see also Wilkes, supra note 48, at 196 (“The dedication process operates in the
following manner: ‘If an owner offers a use of his property to the public, and if the public accepts that
offer, the property will be considered dedicated. A public interest in it will be established although no
consideration has passed.’”).
203
Wilkes, supra note 48, at 196.
204
Protecting the Public Interest in Art, supra note 145, at 127; see also Wilkes, supra note 48, at
196–97 (2012) (“If public dedication can be found, ‘no owner of the property—present or future—will
be permitted to defeat or interfere with the public right to use it for its dedicated purposes.’”).
205
Protecting the Public Interest in Art, supra note 145, at 127–28; see also Wilkes, supra note 48,
at 197 (“The property is deemed to be held in trust for the public even though an actual trust instrument
was never filed. The owner is considered a fiduciary of the public as regards the dedicated use of the
property, and therefore, she may not divert the property to a use that is inconsistent with that of the
public.”).
206
Wilkes, supra note 48, at 197
207
Protecting the Public Interest in Art, supra note 145, at 128.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 126.
210
Wilkes, supra note 48 at 197; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 398 (“Furthermore, even though
public dedication has never been applied to works of art or personal property, ‘American courts and
legislatures are not constrained to obey historically based distinctions between real and personal property
when such distinctions are not useful or relevant,’ and ‘[t]he extension of public dedication doctrine to
certain important works of art would continue trends in both public dedication and real property law.’ A
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and acceptance elements of public dedication “to accommodate situations
where a particular piece of property serves an important public use.”211
Therefore, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the willingness of
courts to expand public-dedication law in the real property context, in
response to “modern public interests,” might encourage them to develop “a
theory of public rights in important works of art.”212
For example, public dedication could easily be applied to public
museum-curated collections. “Art museums collect and display artwork for
purposes of scholarship and cultural education.”213 An individual who
“donates, sells, or loans” a piece of art he or she owns to a museum
“impliedly offers his property to the public for educational uses.”214 In the
terminology of public-dedication law, the donor is “‘throwing open’ his
property to the public for its evident public use,” creating an
“inference . . . that [he or she] intends to dedicate the property for those
cultural and educational purposes.”215 As public museums are considered
cultural representatives of the public, a museum’s acquisition of art, in effect
accepting the offer to dedicate that art permanently to the public, establishes
a permanent public interest in that art.216 However, for the doctrine to attach
to a piece of art, the art must be of sufficient public importance.217 This
requirement could be met by the fact that a museum acquired it,218 but this
means “that the public interest will attach only to a limited amount of art of
recognized quality”;219 by definition, those pieces housed in a museum and
not necessarily in a private collection.220
A museum’s acquisition of a donated piece of art indicates that the
public acting through a public institution has accepted “an owner’s implied
offer to dedicate a work of art.”221 This formulation does not apply in the
case of privately owned art, even if of great public value, because no public
institution is involved. Even if art is loaned to a museum, “a public right” in
that art “could be created through the same offer and acceptance mechanisms
community should explore the viability of a common law public dedication claim if it is faced with the
potential destruction of its heritage.”).
211
Wilkes, supra note 48, at 196.
212
Protecting the Public Interest in Art, supra note 145, at 129.
213
Id. at 132.
214
Id; see also id. at 133 (“Even a loan arrangement represents recognition by the offeree and the
offeror of the permanent educational characteristics of the work. The existence of that implied mutual
understanding constitutes an irrevocable dedication of the work to the public for educational uses.”).
215
Id. at 132 (contrasting Village of Villa Park v. Wanderer’s Rest Cemetery Co., 147 N.E. 104,
105 (Ill. 1925)).
216
Id.
217
Id. at 134.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
See id. at 134 n.72 (providing definitions of a museum).
221
Id. at 134.
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that operate in the context of real property dedication.” This implied
mutual understanding between the museum and the owner of donated,
loaned, or sold art “constitutes an irrevocable dedication of the work to the
public for educational uses.”223 This dedication arguably continues in effect
even if the art is temporarily or permanently removed from the museum’s
collection;224 for example, if the lender of an important piece of art seeks the
art’s return.
For art, the doctrine permanently protects the use of dedicated property,
which would be the public viewing. Consequently, the doctrine could even
compel the showing of deaccessioned art, even though it is now in a private
collection. At minimum, “[s]ince the purpose of public dedication of art is
to educate the public through exposure to the visual characteristics of the
work, a reservation that in effect allowed the dedicator or his successors to
impair those characteristics,” for example by withdrawing loaned art from a
museum for her own use or for sale or export, would conflict with the initial
public dedication and be voidable.225 If the loan of art to a museum creates
an irrevocable dedication, then the doctrine’s use in this context would
create a serious problem because it would discourage private owners of
important works of art from ever loaning that art to a museum, as they would
lose all future control over it.
While using the public-dedication doctrine to protect the public’s
interest in art could be “a step in the right direction,” the concept ignores
privately held art that has never been in a public institution, as it requires the
complete removal of objects from the private realm before the art can
embody the necessary public interest to qualify for the doctrine’s use.226
Additionally, while public dedication preserves the public’s interest in
culturally important works of art, it is hard to see how its application could
compel private owners to relinquish their hold on important public art that
has always been in private hands. The doctrine’s restrictive scope also
contradicts the otherwise-useful view that “certain objects are imbued with
an ‘inherently public’ quality such that public obligations attach even when
these objects are in the possession of a private entity.”227
222

Id. at 131.
Id. at 133.
224
Protecting the Public Interest in Art, supra note 145, at 135; see also id. at 134 n.69 (“The sales
price of the work will not be adversely affected. Future owners will be largely indifferent to the
imposition of the trust because they generally intend to treat the work with care whether or not the trust
is imposed.”).
225
Id. at 133.
226
Wilkes, supra note 48, at 197.
227
Id. at 197–98; see also Rose, supra note 190, at 774 (“For this public to claim property, two
elements were essential: first, the property had to be physically capable of monopolization by private
persons—or would have been without doctrines securing public access against such threats. Second, the
public's claim had to be superior to that of the private owner, because the properties themselves were
most
valuable
when
used
by
indefinite
and
unlimited
numbers
of
persons—by the public at large.”).
223

676

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:3

The common-law property doctrine of public dedication’s focus on
public access, particularly to property that has been dedicated to a public
use, raises some interesting possibilities depending on the willingness of a
court to be persuaded of the fit. One might argue that access to the art is
important to assure that the public experience the art’s educational
properties, like the ability to recreate on land that has been dedicated to the
public for that purpose. In this way, public dedication might assure that the
public has a right to view art in a museum collection.
However, this formulation does not apply in the case of privately owned
art, even if it is of great public value, because no public institution is
involved. The fact that the doctrine only applies to property that is publicly
owned makes it difficult to see how it might be applied to gain public access
to art in a private collection that has not yet been given to a museum or ever
been part of a museum collection.228
On the other hand, public art given to and housed in a public institution
like a museum should be covered by the doctrine, as in all likelihood the art
has been offered to the museum for the purpose of exhibiting the art and
educating the museum’s patrons. The doctrine’s application might inhibit
the museum from selling that art to a private individual or exporting it out
of state. But the art requires a nexus with a public institution to be covered
by the doctrine, making it difficult to see how the doctrine could be extended
to privately held art with no connection to a public institution like a museum.
Therefore, the major weakness of the doctrine in all likelihood remains—
that it does not apply to private owners of important art who hold that art
behind closed doors and who are the target of this Article.
The next Section looks at whether the public trust doctrine might have
the useful features of public dedication, without its problems.
C. The Public Trust Doctrine
“The public trust doctrine is rooted in the precept that some resources
are so central to the well-being of the community that they must be protected
by distinctive, judge-made principles.”229 To the extent the doctrine is
created by judges, not by legislatures, it reflects “the deeply held convictions
of our society.”230 The basis of the doctrine is “that the sovereign holds
228

Protecting the Public Interest in Art, supra note 145, at 136 (“As a prerequisite to enforcement
of the public’s interest in the integrity of artwork, the owner of the work must have adequate notice that
his property is subject to a public trust. Although some owners of dedicated artwork—such as the
museum that acquires the work, the owner of a work on loan, or the first purchaser of a deaccessioned
work of art—would have actual notice of the public use and therefore of the public interest in the artwork,
subsequent owners might not have such notice.”).
229
Charles E. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Lands Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
269, 315 (1980).
230
Id.
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certain common properties in trust in perpetuity for the free and unimpeded
use of the general public.”231 As a trustee of these resources, the government
must protect resources covered by the doctrine from damage, and assure that
those resources are used for a public purpose and are available for public
use.232 Importantly, for purposes of this Article, the public trust doctrine
protects public access to trust resources; preventing access to those resources
violates the doctrine.233
The government’s duty to protect these resources for the benefit and
enjoyment of the general public is affirmative and ongoing.234 Whoever
holds property protected by the doctrine must maintain it for trust-protected
uses, which include public education.235 Public rights of enjoyment in
trust-protected property are protected in perpetuity236 as they are in lands
covered by the public-dedication doctrine. Thus, the public trust doctrine,
like the public-dedication doctrine, is intended to benefit not only present
members of the public but also future generations.237
Since the management of public trust resources should be for the
public’s benefit and not for private gain,238 neither the government nor
private individuals can alienate or adversely affect those rights unless it is
for an equivalent public purpose.239 While public trust property can be
alienated by the legislature, it can only be for a commensurable public
purpose.240 Indeed, according to Professor Sax, “a court will look with
231

Hope M. Babcock, Using the Federal Public Trust Doctrine to Fill Gaps in the Legal Systems
Protecting Migrating Wildlife from the Effects of Climate Change, 95 NEB. L. REV. 649, 674 (2017).
232
Id. at 675.
233
See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1984) (Establishing
that the public-trust doctrine can compel private associations to open membership to the public when
they are nonprofit corporations with activities paralleling those of municipalities. The public in this case
had a right to gain access in order to bathe, swim, and do other shore activities.)
234
Babcock, supra note 232, at 675; see also Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The “Public Trust,” U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1425, 1476 (2016) (“First, in the environmental law arena, the term [public trust] has been
used to describe property administered by the government for public benefit, not routine use as any
private entity could use property.”).
235
See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 379 (Cal. 1971) (applying the public-trust doctrine to
collection of scientific information and aesthetics); see also Kreder, supra note 235, at 1461 (“It seems
firm, however, that part of this public trust concept concerns educating the public.”).
236
See generally, Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect
Where the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-O-Links, and Other Things that Go Bump in the Night, 85
IOWA L. REV. 849, 888–98 (2000) [hereinafter Where the Wild Things Are] (summarizing these and other
aspects of the public trust doctrine); see also Hope M. Babcock, Is Using the Public Trust Doctrine to
Protect Public Parkland from Visual Pollution Justifiable Doctrinal Creep?, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2015)
(describing the origins of the public-trust doctrine and its various uses).
237
Babcock, supra note 232, at 675–76.
238
Id. at 676.
239
See Where the Wild Things Are, supra note 237, at 888–98 (summarizing these and other aspects
of the public-trust doctrine).
240
See Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n of Chi., 263 N.E.2d 11, 21 (Ill. 1970) (allowing the state
legislature to divert trust property, in this case a public park, to a new and different, but comparable use,
a school).
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considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated
either to relocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public
uses to the self-interest of private parties.”241 The extent to which the
doctrine restrains the use of private property makes it very controversial.242
Legal scholars and litigants have proposed the doctrine’s use “to
preserve cultural heritage, including heritage owned by private
individuals.”243 For example, the Detroit Institute of Art used the public trust
doctrine to block the demand by the city’s financial creditors that the
museum sell its collection.244 Although a case of first impression with
respect to the application of the doctrine to the city’s “cultural heritage,” the
museum argued it was indisputable that the doctrine could and should be
expanded “to encompass public resources such as art.”245 Under the public
trust doctrine, the museum argued, its art collection “is subject ‘to the
paramount right of the public to enjoy the benefit of the trust,’” even though
Detroit retained legal title to the collection.246 Although the bankruptcy court
agreed that the state held the art in trust for the benefit of the citizens of
241

Sax, supra note 6, at 490.
See Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W.L. REV.
239, 275 (1992) (“[T]he notion of an evolving unbounded set of communal rights—whether they are
constitutional or common law, procedural or substantive, in all public and private property strips clarity,
certainty, and predictability from the very core of the public trust doctrine.”); James L. Huffman,
Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 1 (2007) (generally criticizing the public-trust doctrine); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions
of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 631, 633 (1986) (“By continuing to resist a legal system that is otherwise being abandoned, the
public trust doctrine obscures analysis and renders more difficult the important process of reworking
natural resources law.”); see also generally Rose, supra note 190, at 722 (“Despite its popularity, the
modern public trust doctrine is notoriously vague as to its own subject matter; cases and academic
commentaries normally fall back on the generality that the content of the public trust is ‘flexible’ in
response to ‘changing public needs.’”). But see Fincham, supra note 72, at 23–24 (saying that the public
trust doctrine “has even reinvigorated the environmental movement by promoting ‘guardianship,
responsibility and community’ in public spaces” (citing Erin Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust:
Theoretical Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVT’L L.
477, 479-80 (2001)); David Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial
Protection of the Public’s Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 311
(1988); Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L. Q. 351 (1998).
243
Smith, supra note 2, at 402; see also id. at 403 (“The discussion of the rationale for group
ownership of cultural property demonstrates that the public trust doctrine inheres in title to all cultural
property.” (quoting Patty Gerstemblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural
Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 559, 670 (1995)). But see, Michael P. Vandenbergh, From
Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 512, 520 (2004) (noting when regulators have tried “to impose restrictions on individual
behavior . . . the restrictions have been unpopular and have provoked a public backlash”).
244
Smith, supra note 2, at 403.
245
Id.; see also Fincham, supra note 72, at 24 (finding parallels between the evolution of the public
trust doctrine from its common law origins to statutes and saying “[s]uch is also the case in many other
nations with respect to cultural heritage, art and antiquities; which are often the subject of national
ownership declarations and other restrictions”).
246
Smith, supra note 2, at 403.
242
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Michigan and denied the financial creditors’ request, it did not directly
decide the issue as to whether the public trust doctrine applied to the
collection.247
This use of the doctrine in the context of public art is not that surprising
given that the doctrine has at its core the concept that some property, even if
owned by an individual, is vested with such communal interest and
importance to the community that the community becomes a dominant
stakeholder in it248— its owner, a permanent trustee of it. The fact that the
public trust doctrine is used to protect “inalienable rights inhering in the
community as a collectivity,” that the doctrine imports the notion of an
owner who functions as trustee of that property, and that rights under the
doctrine are “vindicated by ordinary claims of physical access and use,”249
makes the doctrine’s use to require access to important art that has been
withdrawn from public view promising.
The public trust doctrine is more “nimble” than the doctrine of public
dedication and has a greater capacity to evolve to keep pace with changing
societal needs.250 This plasticity is reflected in the expansion over time in the
doctrine’s geographic scope as well as in the range of activities that are
considered protectable uses of trust resources.251 But applying the doctrine
to privately held art presents new challenges. Although one might “imagine
the environmental public trust doctrine expanding over many years beyond
its environmental roots to other legal fields encompassing delegated public
benefits administration,”252 it has not yet done so, and certainly not yet to a
247

Id.
Sax, supra note 12, at 1558 (“Theories of nonexclusive ownership have seen extensive
elaboration in other contexts, primarily where ordinary use value—rather than iconic value—is at issue.
The public right of passage on navigable rivers and the public trust right in the ocean shore, for example,
are settings in which some sort of distributive justice, usually in the form of general access to the bounty
of nature, seems the central concern . . . .”); see also id. (“The commons and public trust properties reflect
profoundly important traditions, sharing both the notion of inalienable rights inhering in the community
as a collectivity, and the concept of owner as trustee.”).
249
Wilkes, supra note 48, at 195 (“Public trust property reflects important traditions, including ‘the
notion of inalienable rights inhering in the community as a collectivity, and the concept of owner as
trustee.’ The public right in property held in the public trust ‘is vindicated by ordinary claims of physical
access and use.’ The public trust doctrine has previously been used to promote environmental protection
and could be extended to safeguard art objects that are subjected to extensive public use.” (quoting Sax,
supra note 12, at 1558)).
250
Babcock, supra note 232, at 678.
251
See Kreder, supra note 235, at 1447 (“Indeed, Professor Sax argued that the public trust doctrine
is useful ‘whenever governmental regulation comes into question,’ and, although historically the public
trust doctrine was focused on waterways, the modern doctrine is an efficient tool for managing air
pollution, pesticides, strip mining, and wetland filling, among others.” (quoting Sax, supra note 6, at
556–57)); see also Fincham, supra note 72, at 24 (“However, it is not limited to navigation or
commerce—the doctrine applies broadly to the public’s use of resources.”).
252
Kreder, supra note 235, at 1450; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 404 (“Courts have not yet
considered whether the public trust doctrine could apply to cultural heritage or significant works of art.
Even though the public trust doctrine originally only applied to navigable waterways, the doctrine is a
248

680

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:3
253

privately administered public-benefits system like a museum. No state has
applied the public trust doctrine to chattel property, let alone to works of
art.254 Indeed, Professor Brian Frye maintains that the application of the
public trust doctrine to prevent a museum from selling off portions of its
collection is “ridiculous.”255 Professor Frye argues that museums can and do
frequently sell works of art from their collections to private parties.256 But,
that does not mean that those actions are consistent with the public trust
doctrine, should it apply. Nor does Professor Wilkes explain or support his
position that the doctrine could not apply to cultural works of art “that are
completely private in their ordinary use,”257 which seems to contradict the
doctrine’s use to open up private resources, like beaches, to public use.258
Additionally, like private land that becomes impressed with the public trust
doctrine and thus gains some public features, art which enters a museum as
private property becomes part of a public collection held by the museum for
the benefit of the viewing public, and thus gains some degree of
publicness.259 “[O]nce an object enters a museum collection, it becomes part
of the public trust, and a museum’s directors and trustees have a duty to
protect and maintain the object for the benefit of the public.”260
living doctrine and is ‘not . . . ‘fixed or static,’ but one to ‘be molded and extended to meet changing
conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.’”).
253
But see Wilkes, supra note 48, at 196 (“The public trust doctrine has never been extended to
protect the public interest in works of art, but [the removal of a Picasso from the San Francisco Museum
of Modern Art] seems to highlight the necessity for more extensive regulation to safeguard public
expectations in objects that have become part of a local cultural heritage.”).
254
Brian L. Frye, Art and the “Public Trust” in Municipal Bankruptcy, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
627, 657 (2014); see also id. at 656 (“The City did not and could not own the DIA [Detroit Institute of
Art] subject to the ‘public trust’ because the ‘public trust’ doctrine only applies to natural resources like
navigable waters and parks, and does not apply to chattel property like works of art.”).
255
See id. at 664–65 (“However, the argument that art museums own the artworks in their
collections subject to the ‘public trust’ is obviously false and borders on ridiculous. As observed above,
the ‘public trust’ doctrine only applies to natural resources like navigable waters and parks, not chattel
property like artworks.”). But see Fincham, supra note 72, at 27 (“It is often said that once a work of art
enters a museum collection, that museum holds those works in the public trust for future generations in
much the same way that the public may enjoy navigation on public waterways.”).
256
See Frye, supra note 255, at 658 (“‘It is in fact quite conceivable: most works of art are privately
owned.’ Indeed, most art museums are nonprofit corporations that privately own works of art which they
may freely sell.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Donn Zaretsky, There’s No Such Thing as the Public Trust,
and It’s a Good Thing, Too, in THE LEGAL GUIDE FOR MUSEUM PROFESSIONALS 151, 153 (Julia
Courtney, ed. 2015)).
257
Wilkes, supra note 48, at 195 n.156.
258
See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 95 N.J. 306, 326 (N.J. 1984) (holding that “the
public must be given both access to and use of privately-owned dry sand areas” to protect the public’s
right of access to trust-protected property).
259
See Tam, supra note 72, at 861 (“Before entering a museum collection, art is private property
with no public interest. Thus, the public trust doctrine, as applied to museums, connotes the idea that art
owned by museums is part of the public domain for the public benefit. In this regard, the public trust
doctrine would treat art as an abstract trust held by public institutions as a public resource.” (footnotes
omitted)).
260
Id. at 864 (footnote omitted).
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Although the trust that guides museums in their management of their
collections, which binds museums to use their property for identified
charitable purposes,261 is different from and narrower than the trust
envisioned in the public trust doctrine,262 there are interesting overlaps
between the narrower charitable trust doctrine and the broader public trust
doctrine.263 For example, under both doctrines the trustee has a
“responsibility to serve and hold assets in trust for the public benefit.”264
Questions about the geographic reach of the public trust doctrine and the
inclusiveness of triggering activities under it are not so dissimilar from
questions about whether the word “public,” which defines a museum’s
charitable trust obligations with respect to the management of its collections,
refers to a national, regional, state, or local public, or even the community
where the museum is located.265 And behind both the narrow museum
charitable trust doctrine and the broader public trust doctrine is the desire to
prevent commodification of public resources and their transformation into a
private ones.266 Critics of deaccession argue that deaccession violates the
museum’s charitable trust obligation to keep art for future generations, and
that the practice commodifies art by putting art onto the market.267 Just like
261
See id. at 860 (“A public, or charitable, trust is a trust designed to benefit the public. A museum
organized as a public trust has the fiduciary duties to use trust property for designated charitable
purposes.” (footnotes omitted)).
262
See id. (“[M]useums hold their collections in a public trust . . . A public trust is distinguishable
from the public trust doctrine.”); see also id. at 861 (“[E]very side of the deaccessioning debate refers to
museums as a public trust to reference the duties museums owe to the public with respect to their
operations and collections management.”). But see Kreder, supra note 235, at 1460 (“In the museum
world . . . the term [public trust] is a ‘nebulous concept.’”).
263
See Tam, supra note 72, at 861–62 (“[L]eaders in the museum field have put their own twist on
the term ‘public trust,’ and they employ the term not only in the legal sense of setting aside property for
the benefit of the public, but also to refer to ‘the public’s trust in art museums’ as a moral issue.”).
264
Id. at 861; see also id. at 862 (“The public’s trust refers to the trust and confidence that the public
has given to the museum to collect, preserve, and make available works of art. This view contends that
the public has entrusted museums with the authority and responsibility to develop and manage a
collection of art and provide public enjoyment of art through exhibitions.” (footnotes omitted)).
265
See id. at 862 (noting that the scope of the public trust is important).
266
The fact that a museum’s operation might be governed by two versions of trust doctrines, its
own and the broader public-trust doctrine, does not preclude the latter’s application to art in its
collections, any more than the application of the public-trust doctrine is blocked by the application of
other common-law doctrines, like the wildlife trust. See generally Where the Wild Things Are, supra note
237, at 849 (discussing the wildlife trust).
267
E.g., Tam, supra note 72, at 886–87 (“[P]roponents of a broader deaccessioning policy argue
that the limitation on the use of deaccessioning sales proceeds to future acquisitions contradicts the
insistence on keeping art in the public trust for future generations. To illustrate, the Brodsky Bill
concludes that monetization of selected objects from a collection undermines the existence of museums;
however, a deaccession and disposition by sale requires, no matter the use of the sales proceeds, that art
should be considered a commodity. Even when deaccessioning sales proceeds are used for future
acquisitions, that sale itself puts the artwork in the market, makes it a commodity, and removes if from
the public trust. Sometimes, even a transfer of artwork to another museum could violate the public trust
by taking the artwork away from the public to which it was given in trust.” (footnotes omitted)).
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advocates who use the public trust doctrine to prevent privatization of
natural resources, those who oppose museums selling off their public
collections to private individuals argue that “art has an intrinsic value that
cannot be monetized.”268
While the use of the public trust doctrine to gain public access to public
art in private hands is “uncertain,”269 this Part has tried to develop credible
arguments that it could. To support this thesis, the Article has pointed
towards commonalities between public art and public trust-protected
resources, especially the communal importance and educative purpose of
both, and the overlap between doctrines that govern a museum’s trust
obligations towards its collections and the strictures of the more general
public trust doctrine. Additionally, both doctrines seek to prevent
commodification of the trust res and its transfer into private hands, both
employ the concept of a trustee, and public access to trust property can fulfill
the purpose of both doctrines. The public trust doctrine’s essential
communal nature and the educative purpose of public art, the doctrine’s
nimbleness and capacity to expand in response to new problems, and the
comfortable fit between the trust concepts that guide the management of
public museums and those which protect natural resources make the public
trust doctrine a better vehicle than public dedication as a means to gain
public access to privately held important works.
Any application of the doctrine to gain public access to art of national
importance, while theoretically possible, may generate negative
consequences given the doctrine’s capacity to provoke controversy. This
could weaken the doctrine and harden resistance to opening up private art to
public view.270 Therefore, the final Part of the Article searches for ways to
encourage the opening of privately held art to public view prior to the
doctrine’s application, thus softening its use.
VI.

USING INCENTIVES TO GAIN ACCESS TO PRIVATELY HELD
PUBLIC ART

If government values cultural treasures, then it may need to
change existing doctrines in order to provide incentives for
their preservation.271

268

Id. at 883.
See Smith, supra note 2, at 404–05 (“Whether a court would find the public trust doctrine to
apply to public art, especially public art that is that is privately owned, but of great public interest, is
uncertain.”).
270
See SAX, supra note 3, at 66 (“[I]t would be self-defeating to do anything that would encourage
emigration of major collections out of this country to what might be considered more hospitable
venues . . . .”).
271
Gechman, supra note 21, at 594.
269
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Anyone can bring an action in court to enforce the public trust against
someone violating its tenets and seek an injunction to stop the injurious
activity. The injurious action in the case of public art would be preventing
access to it. One way to blunt anticipated resistance to such an undertaking
is to employ ancillary incentives to encourage positive behavior before the
doctrine is resorted to, thus possibly avoiding its application in the first
place.272 This Part discusses three possible incentives which might inspire
private hoarders of important art to release it for public viewing: (1) listing
the art on a national or statewide public register of culturally important art;
(2) using the tax code to encourage the release of privately held art and
discourage its withholding; and (3) providing a system of rewards and
punishments, like shame or guilt, to activate a norm of positive social
behavior. Any one or combination of these, when accompanied by the wellfounded threat of litigation under the public trust doctrine, might induce
private owners of important art to invite the public into their homes or open
their private museums on a limited basis, or to make periodic loans to public
museums or universities where the art could be viewed by the public and
scholars.273
However, any right of public access, such as that proposed here and
above, “would have to be reasonable; it could not overly inconvenience the
owner's enjoyment of the work or force additional costs upon him.”274 Any
right of access should not be “random”; but rather the right should be
“carefully controlled . . . to ensure that works are not totally or arbitrarily
withheld from public view.”275

272
This Article stops short of recommending the enactment of national legislation that might
provide public incentives encouraging private owners to open their collections to public viewing or
encouraging their loan to a public institution like a museum. See Wilkes, supra note 48, at 187 (“The
goal of a comprehensive art preservation law would be to provide public incentives for private owners to
open their collections to the public, subject to certain (time, place and manner) restrictions.”). A concern
is that such a regime might implicate the takings doctrine under the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 193 (“A
preservation law directed at the protection and maintenance of art objects, justified in terms of the public
interest, would be limited by the Takings Clause, with the public interest in art preservation weighed
against the burden on the individual who seeks to use his property in a way that is contrary to that interest.
A regulatory scheme does not constitute a taking so long as it advances a legitimate state (public) interest
and does not deny the (private) owner an ‘economically viable use of his property.’” (citation omitted)).
273
See, e.g., Elsen, supra note 1, at 970 (“The [Polish] Law of 1962 places restrictions on private
ownership that in civil law are called impoverishment of owners' rights. When a given object or book is
registered, the owner ‘is obligated to offer it for sale to national museums or national libraries.’” (quoting
Halina Nieć, Legislative Models of Protection of Cultural Property, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1089, 1094
(1976)).
274
Price, supra note 11, at 1188–89. Professor Price adds additional constraints, such as that the
museum displaying the private art would be liable for any damage to them, and that no single piece of
art could be borrowed by a museum more than once every five years. Id. at 1189.
275
Id. at 1188. Professor Price acknowledges that implementing this right would “involve enormous
practical problems, such as deciding what is reasonable, who is to make the relevant determinations, and
which museums are eligible,” but he believes that state art councils can overcome them. Id.
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A. Creation of a Public Register for Important Works of Art
Listing art on a state or federal register of important art might encourage
its owners to preserve it and to view the listing “as an honor, driving interest,
prestige, and popularity to the art and its owner.”276 Placement on a register
of important art could also enhance its resale value.277 In exchange for the
positive attention such a listing would give to collectors, they might be
encouraged, even required as a condition of listing, to loan their art to a
museum.278
Every state has an agency whose mission is to promote and support the
arts.279 Each state agency could draw up and manage a list of important
public art within its jurisdiction and administer any program designed to
make that art publicly available. State arts councils or the National
Endowment for the Arts could keep lists of qualified art to put owners of
public art on notice of their vulnerability to short-term requisitions for public
showing.280 The National Endowment could secure the public’s interest in
art supported by the Endowment “by asserting a qualified proprietary
interest in them.”281 To assure that important public art is maintained in its
original condition, its owner would be under a perpetual obligation to protect
that art, similar to the obligation of owners of publicly dedicated land to
maintain that land in its original condition.282
The concept of a registry of nationally important art is based on the
National Register of Historic Places, authorized by the National Historic
Preservation Act.283 This register contains a list of places deemed “worthy
of preservation.”284 “The principles underlying historic preservation of
buildings and sites, particularly the emphasis on maintaining structures of

276

Smith, supra note 2, at 385.
An unrelated side benefit, a register of nationally important art might also “heighten public
awareness of the importance of maintaining our cultural heritage.” Wilkes, supra note 48, at 204–05.
278
Id. at 205. On the ability of federally funded programs to require public access as a condition of
receiving money, see Protecting the Public Interest in Art, supra note 145, at 142 (“Because
NEA-supported projects can usually be possessed by only one individual at a time, the NEA cannot, like
other agencies, secure the public interest by guaranteeing the public access to the work it funds.”). By
way of contrast, “[t]he National Science Foundation . . . [can require inventors it funds] to disclose
accurate information about their Foundation-supported activities for other public purposes. Although the
NEA does retain a non-exclusive license to reproduce publishable results of Endowment-supported
activities in furtherance of Endowment purposes, the dissemination of reproductions of works of visual
art cannot satisfactorily take the place of public exposure to the original.” Id. at 142 n.113 (citations
omitted).
279
Protecting the Public Interest in Art, supra note 145, at 130.
280
Id. at 136–37.
281
Id. at 142.
282
Id. at 139.
283
National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. § 302101 (formerly 16 U.S.C. § 470a).
284
National Register of Historic Places, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/nr/
[https://perma.cc/G2ZL-ACBN] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
277
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architectural significance, translate quite easily into a framework for the
preservation of art.”285
While the mere listing of art on some type of public register by itself
places no obligations on the art owners and does not restrict their “use,
treatment, transfer, or disposition” of it,286 there exists a possibility that it
might. Courts have upheld local ordinances allowing the designation of
private property to be of historical value without the owner’s approval,
sometimes even over the owner’s objection.287 The most common use of
these ordinances is to protect “cultural and artistic creations” from
destruction or alteration.288 So there is some potential for the art register to
be used to open up privately held art for public view as a condition of listing
and for courts to sustain those conditions.
B. Use the Tax Code to Encourage Public Display of Privately Held
Important Art
Another source of possible incentives is the tax code. It could be used to
encourage the loan of privately held public art to museums or other public
institutions, or to encourage private owners of such art to make it publicly
available on the owner’s premises.289 For art owners who have private
285

Wilkes, supra note 48, at 199.
Smith, supra note 2, at 385.
287
Id. at 389 (discussing the Supreme Court decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 115 (1978)); see also id. at 387 (“For instance, similar to other landmark
ordinances, Chicago’s Landmarks Ordinance states that its purpose is to ‘safeguard . . . historic and
cultural heritage, as embodied and reflected in such areas, districts, places, buildings, structures, works
of art, and other objects’ and to ‘identify, preserve, protect, enhance, and encourage continued utilization
and the rehabilitation of such . . . works of art . . . having a special historical, community, architectural,
or aesthetic interest or value to the City . . . and its citizens.’”).
288
Id. at 391.
286

In 1982, California enacted the California Art Preservation Act (‘CAPA’). CAPA was
the first of its kind in the U.S. to acknowledge ‘a public interest in preserving the
integrity of cultural and artistic creations’ independent of the interest of the artist.
Specifically, CAPA permits an arts organization ‘acting in the public interest’ to seek
an injunction preventing ‘a work of fine art’ from ‘physical defacement, mutilation,
alteration, or destruction.’ The Act defines ‘fine art’ as an ‘original painting, sculpture,
or drawing, or an original work of art in glass, of recognized quality and of substantial
public interest.' It looks to opinions of ‘artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art,
curators of art museums, and other persons involved with the creation or marketing of
fine art’ to determine whether a piece of art is of recognized quality and substantial
public interest.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Wilkes, supra note 48, at 205 (“An art preservation regime should apply
only to those works of art deemed to embody a substantial public interest.”).
289
Wilkes, supra note 48, at 187; see also id. at 204 (“[T]he government could provide tax credits
for loan-related expenses directly to the owners of works of art to be placed on display or incorporated
into a traveling exhibition. This system would provide stronger incentives to the wealthy owners of these
works, who are consistently seeking mechanisms by which to offset their tax liability.”).
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museums and count on the largess of the tax code to shelter the value of the
art they donate to those museums when they die, any tax benefit accruing to
these private institutions could be conditioned on opening them to the public
on a regular basis. Like a national or state register of important public art,
using tax credits to encourage owners of such art to loan their art to a public
museum or make it publicly available on site might increase the donation
value of the art and enhance the donor’s prestige in addition to providing a
welcome deduction from an owner’s annual tax.290 However, modifying the
tax code requires congressional or regulatory action, both of which may be
problematic.
Access incentives through a loan-donation program to a public museum
require a willing museum. Professor Sax, in his book Playing Darts with a
Rembrandt, mentions a summer loan program that the Metropolitan
Museum of Art in New York City administers as an example of such a
program in which the museum invites collectors of important works of art
to lend them to the museum for temporary exhibition during vacation
months.291 He even suggests that such a loan donation program might be
made obligatory,292 which might be viable if the donor receives any type of
tax credit as a result of the loan. Other museums might adopt this program
as a relatively costless way of temporarily augmenting their collections.
C. Activate Behavioral Norms to Discourage Private Hoarding of
Important Art
Well-publicized incentives and clear norms of expected behavior can
foster desirable behavior. Norms, which are neither created nor enforced by

290

Id. at 203 (“The most logical step would be to provide tax breaks to private owners who loan
their works to public institutions for public display. This type of arrangement would have dual benefits
for owner-collectors, since the sale price and donation value increase when artwork is placed on loan.”);
see also Price, supra note 11, at 1190 (“The administration of such a tax might include an exemption for
works loaned to public museums for exhibition. In the United States prior to 1969 some courts implied
that the owner of a painting could take a charitable deduction for the value of the work for the period of
exhibition. One could conceive of a regime which extended the rationale for this implication to require
that the owner of a work could avoid exhibition only by the payment of a tax.” (footnote omitted)).
291
SAX, supra note 3, at 66.
292
Id. at 67; see also Wilkes, supra note 48, at 209 (“Where incentive structures (or the ‘carrot’
method) fail to satisfy the public interest in particular works of art, a more stringent approach would be
to implement ‘a system of obligatory, expense-compensated loans to public institutions.’ Under this
system, owners would be obligated to loan previously unavailable works in which there is a strong public
or scholarly interest to a major museum or other public institution.” (footnote omitted)). Professor Sax
proposes using a committee of experts to identify important artists and/or works of art of sufficient
importance to be on a “national loan list” that have not been publicly exhibited recently. The requisitioned
art could then be exhibited at a museum in the United States for a limited period of time, not to exceed
three months, and would be free from a repeat requirement for at least ten years. Id. at 209. Wilkes
believes implementing Sax’s proposal would be difficult, but within “the realm of practicability.” Id.
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293

the government, offer a low-keyed way to influence personal behavior.
They are informal rules that reflect society’s view of what is correct behavior
and can carry some persuasive power with respect to individual actions. 294
This Section examines whether there is an external social norm that might
induce private owners of public art to make that art available for public
viewing, or if one does not exist, whether circumstances exist that might
activate such a norm.
Social norms can be “internalized (and enforced through guilt)
or . . . may arise without internalization (and be enforced through external
non-legal sanctions such as stigma or ostracism).”295 Non-internalized (or
external) norms reflect a broad public consensus about social obligations
which may result in external social sanctions if they are not complied with.296
External norms reflect “a social consensus regarding what behaviors are
esteem-worthy. They are enforced by the consensus through a process of
surveillance of others, and they are externally imposed on the norm-violator
by others through the withholding of esteem.”297 An example of an external
norm in this situation would be one that disapproved of keeping from public
view privately held important works of art. But it is not clear that there is a
social norm against hoarding of public art, though there may be one against
its destruction, alteration, or misappropriation.
Norms, or correct social behavior, can be taught, but they can also arise
in an “unplanned fashion out of ongoing interaction.”298 A “[m]oral order”
can be “an interactional phenomenon,”299 in which one party’s actions show
the other the right thing to do. In some situations, behavioral norms arise
when enough individuals indicate a desire to cooperate in some positive
behavior, through what Eric Posner calls “signaling,”300 which, in turn,
makes the correct behavior seem ordinary.301 Thus, there is a possibility that
a norm in favor of public viewing of important art could arise among private
293
Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference
to Sanctions, 19 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 369, 369 (1999).
294
See id. at 369–70 (noting that norms are a form of social control that can be independent of
laws).
295
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command and Control, 20 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 191, 200 (2001).
296
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate
Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 69 (2003).
297
Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV.
605, 621 (2004) (footnote omitted).
298
Karp also notes that these repeated interactions can create habits and become expected behavior
by the individual in the minds of others, constraining the actor to avoid disappointment if the expectation
is not lived up to. David R. Karp, The New Debate About Shame in Criminal Justice: An Interactionist
Account, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 301, 313 (2000) (quoting DENNIS HUME WRONG, THE PROBLEM OF ORDER:
WHAT UNITES AND DIVIDES SOCIETY 48 (1994)).
299
Id.
300
ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 25–26 (2000).
301
Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1241 (2001).
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collectors, if enough of them conceived this as the correct behavior and acted
accordingly.
However, to activate a behavioral norm, the targeted individuals must
be aware of the consequences of their action on the public welfare or the
welfare of others and must understand their personal responsibility for those
actions.302 These feelings will generate a sense of internal obligation to
comply with the norm and a feeling of guilt, if they violate it.303 Once a
behavioral norm is activated, an intention is formed in the mind of the actor
to behave in a particular way if barriers to that behavior are not
created—like additional costs, increased effort, or social costs, for example,
rejection by one’s social or professional group.304
Obeying the dictates of a norm can generate monetary costs, lost
opportunities, inconvenience, or additional effort.305 For example,
conforming to a norm supporting the public interest in viewing important art
requires effort, such as opening private homes or museums to the public or
loaning art to a museum, and may generate costs, like additional insurance,
private guards, and transportation fees, if the art is being loaned to a
museum. On the other hand, opening privately held art to public view can
generate “praise, esteem, promotion, and preferential dealings” from
like-minded individuals who ascribe to the same norm, and avoids the risk
of social sanctions for doing the reverse.306 The government can help an
individual internalize positive social behavior, here opening privately held
art to public view, by honoring that individual in some way—such as listing
that art on a public register, giving the owner an award, or even publicly
praising the owner—or by doing the opposite, for example by withdrawing
or constraining tax benefits.307

302

Vandenbergh, supra note 298, at 73 (2003); see also Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms:
How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 1101, 1120 (2005) (“To
activate a concrete norm, an individual must hold two types of beliefs. First, she must be aware of the
consequences
of
her
act
regarding
the
objects
of
the
abstract
norm . . . . Second, she must take personal responsibility for causing those consequences.”).
303
Vandenbergh, supra note 298, at 73.
304
Vandenbergh, supra note 304, at 1121–22.
305
On the importance of effort and its obverse convenience, Professor Carlson concludes, based on
empirical data on successful recycling programs, that the force of social norms is fairly limited.
Instead, reducing the effort required to engage in the desired behavior can have far
greater success in increasing the numbers of people who will cooperate over a long
period of time than efforts to intensify social norms. In fact, increasing convenience
is so effective that individual commitment toward the desired behavior bears little
relationship to whether someone will engage in it.
Carlson, supra note 303, at 1236.
306
Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and
Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2000).
307
Id. at 19.
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Although people can be encouraged to adopt and adhere to desired
“normative frameworks,” the targeted individual must justify these
frameworks cognitively if they are going to positively motivate the
individual’s behavior.308 Therefore, for an external norm to work that
discourages private hoarding of public art, the art owner must appreciate the
art’s value to the public. An individual who possesses an important piece of
art probably is aware of that art’s public value or the individual would not
have acquired it in the first place, although he or she may be less aware of
its broader public educational value. Owners might also reason that it is to
their advantage to conform to a norm of making important art available to
public view to avoid public shame for withholding art that the public wants
to see.
Guilt and shame are effective informal motivators and enforcers of
socially desirable behavior.309 The typical circumstances in which guilt can
be neutralized, such as legal complexity, the absence of an identifiable
victim, necessity, and denial of responsibility,310 would not be relevant in
the case of an individual hoarding public art. The public is an identifiable
victim, there is no legal complexity involved, there is no need to hoard art
other than personal gratification, and there is no way to avoid responsibility,
as there is also no one else to blame.
A feeling of guilt can be brought about because of the person’s education
and upbringing regardless of the external effects of his or her action.311 Thus,
an individual might be unmoved by the negative effects on the public weal
of the withdrawal of art from public view but, because of his or her
privileged background, might feel guilt. However, wealthy individuals like
art hoarders, even in “closeknit societies,” are among the most likely to
ignore or contravene social norms and “risk shaming sanctions” because
their wealth insulates them.312
The most effective ways to increase individual compliance with a social
norm are face-to-face contact with the norm violator and personal
feedback.313 The reasons these two techniques are effective is that they
increase “opportunities to signal or gather esteem, while simultaneously
308

Christopher Deabler, The Normative and Legal Deficiencies of “Public Morality,” 19 J.L. &
POL’Y 23, 34 (2003); see also id. at 34–35. (“This framework must consist of a justification of norms
generally and the justification of their societal implementation.”).
309
Vandenbergh, supra note 298, at 83. But see POSNER, supra note 302, at 43 (“‘[N]o
well-developed theory of guilt allows us to make predictions about when’ it will be influential or ‘what
kind of people feel guilt and what kinds of people do not. So . . . we cannot rely on a theory of guilt for
an explanation.’”).
310
Vandenbergh, supra note 298, at 83.
311
Eric B. Rasmusen & Richard A. Posner, Creating and Enforcing Norms, With Special Reference
to Sanctions 371 (Coase-Sandor Instit. for L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 96, 2000).
312
Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880,
1916–17 (1991).
313
Carlson, supra note 303, at 1299.
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314

increasing attitudes in favor of the behavior.” However, neither personal
contact nor feedback is likely in the case of an individual who is hoarding
public art in his or her private residence or on-site museum. In those
circumstances, the individual’s actions are not observable by anyone or do
not occur in an amorphous group setting. This shortcoming can make the
use of behavioral norms and personal sanctions problematic. Additionally,
when there is a risk that compliance with a social norm will have a negative
payoff, such as loss of esteem among one’s peers—here, other private
collectors of important art—and the individual is not part of a close-knit
group like a neighborhood or family, an individual can externalize the harms
caused by his or her actions with the result that the costs of behavioral
change may exceed its benefits.315
When an individual’s actions conform to an internal norm’s dictates, he
or she generally feels a sense of pride and increased self-esteem; “enhanced
reputation or the esteem of others” are the “reward” of conforming to an
external norm.”316 When external expectations are violated, they become
violations of obligations and may subject the violator to social sanctions.317
Social sanctions in the case of a breached external norm include “gossip,
stigma, shaming or ostracism,” any one of which can be unpleasant and all
of which are easy to enforce because they do not involve high transaction
costs.318 One caveat to the effectiveness of shaming or gossip as a norm
enforcement tool is if privacy is viewed as a superior good. If so, then their
enforcement effectiveness may be reduced.319 Among wealthy hoarders of
important art, it is not unreasonable to assume that privacy is highly
regarded, thus diminishing the value of any public “outing” of any negative
behavior.
On the other hand, an owner of important art is like a competitive
consumer, who desires to own something that will create envy in his or her
community because he or she possesses something that is “an observable

314

Id. at 1300.
Vandenbergh, supra note 304, at 1105.
316
Vandenbergh, supra note 298, at 70.
317
David R. Karp, The New Debate About Shame in Criminal Justice: An Interactionist Account,
21 JUST. SYS. J. 301, 314 (2000).
318
Vandenbergh, supra note 298, at 70. Another reason that shaming can be effective is that it
prevents the offender from profiting from their offending action. See Karp, supra note 300, at 304 (“The
essence of debasement penalties is status diminution through embarrassment and humiliation. The
negative feelings about the offender’s behavior are communicated through imposed negative experience.
This captures the practical function of retribution by disallowing the offender the opportunity to profit
from the offending act.”).
319
Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 295, at 381; see also Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social
Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553, 558 (1998) (“[T]he legal
protection of privacy undermines regulation by social norms because such regulation depends on the
detectability of violations by ordinary citizens; the ostracizers (norm enforcers).”).
315

2018]

THE PUBLIC TRUST IN PUBLIC ART

691
320

symbol” of “success under prevailing social norms.” The same public
esteem that the collector seeks for himself or herself as an owner of
important art can make that individual susceptible to negative feedback
about his or her behavior.321 In most situations, people want to be seen as
socially responsible individuals.322
Business leaders, who may also be public art hoarders, “may be
especially susceptible to shaming rituals.” This is because they are likely to
be sensitive to public appearances and “vulnerable to moralistic or
judgmental social groups.”323 Shaming can ruin an offender’s good
reputation, which could adversely affect their business dealings.324 The
effectiveness of shame depends on the community in which negative action
took place. One reason shaming may not work in this situation is that art
hoarders may not be members of a discrete group, like a religious or ethnic
community, so the shame may not compromise their social standing in any
group. To the extent the offender’s group is other private art collectors or
dealers, they may not shun him or her as they share the offender’s values.325
Moreover, in atomized communities, such as the highly competitive
community of wealthy art consumers where “social life is so thin,” shame is
unlikely to be an effective deterrent.326
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Shaming can “backfire, if the person being shamed does not accept the
legitimacy of the punishment,” and can destroy the effectiveness of the
sanction.327 Thus, the effectiveness of any form of social ostracism,
including shame, is not assured in the case of a private art hoarder, even
though in many other situations it can be an effective sanction.328 All else
being equal, shaming penalties are likely to be more effective in Kenosha
than they are in Manhattan. It is more likely that art hoarders live in or close
to major urban areas like New York City than in Kenosha, Wisconsin, with
a population of less than 100,000.329 “This is not to say they will be wholly
ineffective in Manhattan, only that we should expect less.”330
In sum, an external behavioral norm to discourage private hoarding of
public art may be difficult to activate and enforce, although not impossible
if conditions are conducive to its emergence. To the extent private owners
of public art benefit from public approval of their behavior and are harmed
when their actions are condemned, the external norms may be effective.
Publication of good and bad behavior in widely read print or online journals
can arm the public with information that can be used to pressure improved
social behavior by targeted art hoarders; public honors or awards
recognizing art owners who make their art publicly available could make
their esteem rise in the eyes of the public.
The goal of this Part has been to identify extralegal inducements to
encourage hoarders of public art to make that art available for public
viewing. Because application of the public trust doctrine to achieve this goal
might be too incendiary to invite its use, this Part has suggested a mix of
incentives and disincentives to complement the doctrine’s application. Each
one by itself or in tandem with any of the others, backed up by the threat of
public trust litigation, might pry the art out of the hoarder’s grasp for public
view. For example, conditioning listing art on a prestigious register of
important art on its public availability or using the tax code to encourage art
owners to open their private museums to the public might achieve that result.
Activated norms might also promote more public-spirited social behavior by
private art collectors where the benefit of opening their collections is greater
327
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than its costs, and thus may also be a viable way to cushion the use of the
public trust doctrine.331
CONCLUSION
A legal regime mandating preservation of art objects could be
constructed to account for this delicate balance between the
public interest in the maintenance of cultural heritage and the
economic expectations of collectors/purchasers of art
objects.332
What this Article has done is identify a problem (the hoarding of
nationally important art by private individuals) and propose a solution (the
application of an “enhanced” public trust doctrine, triggered only if other
measures fail to compel public access to that art). In doing this, the Article
defines a category of art to be of such importance to the education and good
citizenship practices of a country’s citizenry that to withhold it from public
appreciation is to diminish both and thus weaken important republican
values. It identifies and critiques ways to persuade hoarders of this art to
open it to public view, specifically the doctrine of moral rights and laws like
the Visual Artists Rights Act, but finds them wanting as they only protect
the art from physical destruction and give enforcement rights to the artist,
not to the public. The Article also examines the common-law doctrines of
public dedication and public trust, finding that of the two, the latter’s
flexibility and better fit with public art makes it the more attractive doctrine
for these purposes.
However, applying the public trust doctrine stretches it well beyond its
traditional comfort zone, and even its traditional application generates
significant controversy. Therefore, the Article recommends what it calls an
enhanced public trust doctrine, one augmented by personal and financial
incentives or by external social norms designed to persuade owners of
important public art to allow access to it by opening their own residences or
private museums to the public or loaning this art to a public institution like
a museum. In such a scenario, the public trust doctrine would wait in the
wings, a stick held aloft, but not descended unless incentives and sanctions
failed to induce the correct behavior.
In writing this piece, the author has drawn on the contribution of many
others, principally Professor Joseph Sax who remains an inspiration for
many of us.333 She has borrowed ideas from him and others and tried to
331
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weave them together to tell a compelling story about a private wrong with
an adverse public effect. If she has succeeded, she is in their debt, but her
failure is hers alone. She can only hope that others more imaginative than
she will find a way to reintroduce this art to the public who supported its
creation and now deserves to have it available to enjoy.

